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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays on the information and transparency in firms.  In 
the first essay, we provide some of the first evidence regarding the impact of safety expenditures 
on moral hazard induced by increases in workers’ compensation benefits. Prior studies have 
inferred the effect of safety incentives by testing the relation between claims frequency and 
benefit increases. However, these studies have not explicitly modeled the impact of actual safety 
expenditures. Using a proprietary dataset containing policy-level data for several thousand 
policies over a 13-year period we show that safety expenditures play a positive role in reducing 
the moral hazard response to changes in workers’ compensation benefits. 
In the second essay, we investigate financial strength ratings of insurance companies 
which have received considerable attention, with good reason due to recent insolvencies in 
financial institutions. Interestingly, observations of market returns around downgrades in insurer 
financial strength ratings (IFSR) become significantly negative, suggesting that some 
sophisticated investors anticipate the price reaction to downgrades which are viewed as negative 
news.  Research argues that short sellers are informed investors as current short selling relates 
inversely with future returns.  However, empirical results have yet to determine whether short 
sellers trade on private information before, say, an upcoming negative new events or whether 
short sellers are superior in their ability to process public information.  This paper takes a step in 
this direction by examining short selling around IFSR by examining short-selling activity around 
A.M. Best ratings changes. While we find abnormal short selling prior to ratings downgrades, we 
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also find that an insurers’ asset and liability opaqueness negatively affects the level of short 
selling activity prior to a financial strength ratings downgrade. We are left to conclude that while 
short sellers anticipate IFSR downgrades, they do not appear to be superior in their information 
processing ability around IFSR changes. 
In the third essay, due to the advent of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) a growing 
body of research related to its determinants, organization, and value-relevance has been 
motivated. While several recent studies test whether ERM benefits firms, there is an absence of 
studies that examine how ERM can generate value. Our paper provides some initial evidence on 
one potential source of value from an ERM program; an increase in transparency regarding the 
firm’s risk profile. Using dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts as a proxy for transparency we 
find that firm-level transparency increases following the adoption of an ERM initiative. The 
increase in transparency is greatest for firms that are operationally and financially opaque. 
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ESSAY 1:  
THE IMPACT OF SAFETY EXPENDITURES ON MORAL HAZARD 
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CHAPTER 1.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the passage of workers’ compensation (WC) statutes in the early 1900s, recourse 
for work-related injuries was based on the tort system and therefore required proof of employer 
negligence. Employers generally prevailed in litigation; however they faced substantial risk of 
unpredictable losses in the event of successful worker suits. Ultimately, both employers and 
employees favored WC legislation that provided no-fault compensation to injured workers and 
substantially limited employer liability.  
WC insurance, the primary mechanism for funding statutory WC disability benefits 
(WCB), creates incentives for workplace safety and injury prevention by tying employer 
premiums to their past loss history. Ceteris paribus, this experience rating system should 
decrease WC losses. However, the statutory provision of no-fault benefits for employee injuries 
creates incentives for greater risk taking and/or increased injury claims. An important empirical 
question arises: Does the safety effect of experience rating dominate the effect of employee 
moral hazard resulting from a no-fault benefit provision?  
Using a sample of detailed policy-level underwriting, claims, and safety expenditure data 
for several thousand policies over the period of 1995-2007, we examine the net effect of safety 
expenditures on WC losses. Using this unique dataset we are able to estimate the impact of 
changes in safety expenditures on changes in loss costs, holding constant benefit changes. 
Subsequently, we show that safety expenditures play a positive role in reducing the moral hazard 
response to changes in WCB. Prior studies have inferred the net effect of safety incentives by 
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estimating the relation between benefit increases and claims/injury frequency or severity (Butler 
and Worrall, 1991; Moore and Viscusi, 1989). However, these studies have not explicitly 
modeled the impact of actual safety expenditures.  
We first examine changes in loss cost around changes in WCB, referred to as the moral 
hazard hypothesis. Secondly, we examine the relation of changes in safety expenditures on 
changes in loss costs, holding constant benefit changes, referred to as the dominance hypothesis.  
Our result in regards to the moral hazard hypothesis is expected. First, we find evidence of 
increases in loss cost around increases in WCB, ceteris paribus. Additionally, we find safety 
expenditures negatively affect loss cost, indicating the potential effectiveness of safety in 
reducing real injury cost. In testing the dominance hypothesis our results are interesting. While 
moral hazard is still evident in our sample, we show that safety expenditures play a positive role 
in reducing the moral hazard response to changes in WCB. Our findings provide some of the first 
evidence that safety expenditures play a positive role in reducing the moral hazard responses to 
changes in benefits while at the same time reducing real injury loss cost. 
Empirically, the presence of moral hazard has been tested by examining the change in 
claims rates in response to increases in WCB. Overall, the majority of the findings support the 
indication that an increase in WCB leads to an increase in claims (Dionne & St Michel, 1991; 
Danzon & Harrington, 2001; Butler and Worrall, 1991; Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin, 1995; 
Butler, Garner & Garner, 1997; Butler, Garner & Garner, 1998; Butler, 1994; Ruser, 1991). Our 
univariate tests indicate that the greater the increase in WCB the larger the change in loss cost. 
This result is consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis and previous literature that as benefits 
increase moral hazard is one resulting outcome.  
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In our multivariate tests we find an increase in loss cost around changes in WCB, ceteris 
paribus. Our results are consistent with moral hazard with existing benefit changes (Dionne & St 
Michel, 1991; Danzon & Harrington, 2001; Butler and Worrall, 1991; Meyer et al., 1995; Butler, 
et al., 1997; Butler et al., 1998; Butler, 1994; Ruser, 1991). In addition, we examine the relation 
between safety expenditures and loss cost holding WCB constant. Our results indicate a negative 
relationship, suggesting safety expenditures play a positive role in reducing the moral hazard 
responses to changes in benefits while at the same time reducing real injury loss cost.  These 
findings are relevant in the WC literature as others (Butler and Worrall, 1991), have indicated 
that moral hazard dominates the safety incentive for the employer. Our results provide initial 
evidence that while moral hazard exists, safety expenditures reduce the dominating moral hazard 
response observed around WC benefit changes. 
We further extend our analysis by examining the relation between safety expenditures 
and loss cost holding WCB constant, in a sub sample of claims related to hard to diagnose 
injuries, and claims of a lengthened duration.  Butler et al. (1997) reports the distribution of WC 
claims has exhibited a shift towards soft tissue injuries such as sprains, strains, and low back 
claims, and that nearly 30% of the increase in soft tissue related claims can be explained by 
moral hazard (Butler, et al., 1997; Butler et al., 1998). Further, a number of studies show that 
WC claim duration is affected by the monetary incentives and socioeconomic characteristics 
(Butler & Worrall, 1985, Fenn, 1981; Meyer et al., 1995, Fenn, 1981). Meyers et al. (1995) and 
Fenn (1981) show time out of work increased based on the generosity or level of WCB available. 
Similar to our complete sample, we find evidence of moral hazard when conditioning on hard to 
diagnose injuries and the duration of claims development. More importantly, we find when 
conditioning on claims characteristics synonymous with moral hazard, we again find a negative 
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relationship, suggesting safety expenditures play a positive role in reducing the moral hazard 
responses to changes in benefits while at the same time reducing real injury loss cost. 
 
The next section reviews related prior literature. The following section develops our hypotheses, 
and sample and data are introduced in the subsequent section. The next two sections present our 
empirical methodology and discuss our results. The final section concludes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
CHAPTER 1.2 
PRIOR LITERATURE 
Workers’ compensation provides benefits to employees who are injured at work or 
sustain a work-related illness/disease. These benefits include medical expenses for work-related 
conditions, payments that partially replace lost income and survivor benefits when a fatality 
occurs. According to the National Safety Council, between 1972 and 1992, US employer costs 
for providing WC increased from $6 billion to $61 billion, a yearly growth rate of 12.5%; then 
reaching $64 billion in 2001. In 2006, the economic impact of workplace injuries was estimated 
to be $164.7 billion (National Safety Council, 2007), with WC cost of $12.58 per $100 of 
covered wages, total cash benefits to injured workers and medical payments for their health care 
were $54.7 billion, and costs to employers were $87.6 billion (National Academy of Social 
Insurance, 2007).  
Prior to the inception of WC legislation, there was a single recourse for an injured 
worker’s work-related injury. This was to bring a legal suit against the employer and prove that 
the employer’s negligence caused the injury. When the tort system was the only option for 
settlement, a majority of the time the workers did not recover damages and experienced delays in 
receiving compensation for their work related injuries. However, while employers usually were 
successful in a legal defense, there was a significant risk for large losses if the worker prevailed 
with the suit. Overtime, both employers and workers were in favor of WC legislation which 
ensured that a worker who sustained a work related injury/illness or disease arising out of and in 
the course of employment would receive benefits, regardless of who was at fault. In order to do 
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so, the employer’s liability was limited, providing the exclusive remedy model where the worker 
accepts WCB as payment in full and gives up the right to sue.  
 
While the movement for the adoption of WC was to replace employers’ tort liability with 
a no-fault system, the systems structure through the use of experience rating and federal statues 
imposes incentives for safety. Workers compensation is expected to encourage employers to 
provide improved workplace safety because each employer would take on the costs of its 
workers injuries more so than under tort liability. The foundation for this approach is that risk-
based premiums are more reasonable and also promote greater system effectiveness by 
convincing employers to internalize more of the costs associated with their risk level. In theory, 
this should encourage employers to optimize expenditures on safety and the control of 
compensation costs; such that the cost of injuries would be included in the employer’s business 
costs, and employers would be motivated to reduce premium costs by placing an emphasis on the 
safety and improving working conditions. 
Although the WC system resulted in consistent and predictable benefits without the 
employee/employer relationship enduring a legal process; the expectation of enhanced safety did 
not take into account factors that would weaken safety. The most widely examined of these 
factors is moral hazard. Due in part that wage-replacement benefits compensate employees for 
not working, there is an inherent behavioral incentive to amplify the severity of existing injuries, 
time away from work due to injury, and/or misrepresenting where the injury occurred (i.e. work 
or away from work). This misrepresentation of risk is termed “moral hazard” and comes from the 
information asymmetries between employer and employee.  
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Dionne & St Michel (1991) presented early work looking at moral hazard in the WC 
system and suggested two types of moral hazard. The first type is related to self-prevention 
activities affecting probabilities of accidents. The second type relates to the insured activities 
whenever the accident occurs. Their results indicated that moral hazard was present due to the 
outcomes that the length of the recovery period was associated with an increase in insurance 
coverage for injuries which are difficult to diagnose. Several studies of the moral hazard effects 
have confirmed that higher WCB tend to increase the frequency and duration of claims (Danzon 
& Harrington, 2001; Butler and Worrall, 1991; Chelius, 1977; Cheluis and Kavanaugh, 1988).  
Butler and Worrall (1991) summarizes the ways in which moral hazard develops, 
suggesting when indemnity benefits increase, workers may engage in more risks, since the cost 
of lost income is reduced. Additionally, since the increase in benefits results in higher premiums, 
employers may initiate risk control measures. The combination of the effects is referred as "risk 
bearing" moral hazard. Butler and Worrall (1991) introduce a second type of moral hazard which 
occurs when workers reports claims for a level of injury for which the worker would not have 
reported a claim, whereas the employers may respond with increased monitoring claims. The 
combination of the worker and employers response is termed "claims bearing" moral hazard. 
Butler & Worrall (1991) investigate the two types of moral hazard and suggest that loss growth 
largely reflects increased claims reporting rather than increased employer or employee risk-
taking behavior. Overall, the majority of the findings lend support that an increase in benefits 
leads to an increase in claims (Danzon & Harrington, 2001; Butler and Worrall, 1985; Meyer et 
al., 1995; Butler et al., 1997; Butler et al., 1998; Butler, 1994; Ruser, 1991).  
More recent moral hazard literature has investigated claims behavior related to hard to 
diagnose injuries (i.e. soft tissue injuries) (Butler, Durbin, &. Helvacian, 1996). These types of 
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injuries lend themselves well to an increased proportion of moral hazard initiated claims. Butler 
et al. (1996) reports the distribution of workers' compensation claims has exhibited a shift 
towards soft tissue injuries such as sprains, strains, and low back claims. Furthermore, the 
authors report that nearly 30% of the increase in soft tissue related claims can be explained by 
moral hazard. These findings are consistent with Butler (1994) who shows increases in both the 
frequency and severity of insurance claims as the wage replacement rate increased and as the 
waiting period decreased. These findings are supporting early work by Ruser (1991) who 
suggested higher benefits are found generally to increase lost-workday cases. Overall, results 
consistently indicate an increase in WCB resulted in an increase in claims.  
In a similar stream of literature focusing on claims characteristics, a number of studies 
show that workers compensation claim duration is affected by the monetary incentives and 
socioeconomic characteristics (Butler & Worrall, 1991, Fenn, 1981; Meyer et al., 1995; Butler, 
Baldwin, & Johnson, 2001). Meyer et al (1995) investigated the effect of workers' compensation 
on time out of work around increases in maximum weekly benefits. In their sample, benefit 
amount for high-earnings individual’s increases by approximately 50 percent, while low-
earnings individuals did not experience a change in their incentives. The findings indicated time 
out of work increased for those eligible for the higher benefits and remained unchanged for those 
whose benefits were constant. Fenn (1981) focuses on the duration of individual sickness 
absence using British survey data of illness or injury victims. He found that as the relative 
generosity of sick pay increased, there was a disincentive effect in that the duration of illness 
lengthened. Butler et al. (2001) follow and examined workers compensation claim duration for 
workers with serious low-back injuries, reporting elapsed claim duration vary significantly with 
employee characteristics and economic incentive to return to work.  
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There are a few findings that differ from the consensus, by showing when the risk 
measure more accurately captures the severity of accidents; benefit increases have a negative 
effect on risk levels for more severe risks. Chelius (1976) found that the introduction of WC 
resulted in a decrease in fatality rates over the period 1900-1940. Chelius (1982) examined the 
impact of workers' compensation benefits on the allocation of resources to injury prevention. His 
findings suggests that higher compensation benefits are associated with lower severity rates of 
injury, suggesting that higher benefits induce employers to spend more on the prevention of 
serious injuries.  Moore and Viscusi (1989) suggested that the most severe accidents should 
reflect very little moral hazard, since for example traumatic injuries or deaths cannot be falsely 
claimed. This is to say that the value a worker implicitly attaches to their life suggest that 
workers are not willing to substitute fatality benefits for their own life. Therefore, if workers' 
compensation provides any safety incentives to firms, these will be reflected most strongly in the 
fatality rate data. Moore and Viscusi (1989) reported a dramatic safety effect without a moral 
hazard response around benefit changes. Taken together, the results in Chelius (1976, 1982) and 
Moore and Viscusi (1989) suggest an employer dominated effect rather than the documented 
moral hazard dominance.  
While it is clear the WC system structure through the use of experience rating and federal 
statues imposes incentives for safety, the academic literature varies in its view of the moral 
hazard response to WCB. The consensus in the literature indicates that while it does seem that 
work places are becoming safer as measured by the reduction in real injuries, there is a 
documented moral hazard response to changes in WCB (Butler and Worrall, 1988; Meyer et al., 
1995; Kreuger, 1990; Butler et al., 1997; Butler et al., 1998; Butler, 1994; Ruser, 1991). 
However, there are others who suggest that the WC systems’ incentive for safety is dominant and 
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therefore higher levels of workers' compensation benefits actually save employers money by 
promoting workplace safety (Chelius, 1976, Chelius, 1982; Moore and Viscusi, 1989). This 
varying viewpoint motivates our question: Does the safety effect of experience rating dominate 
the effect of employee moral hazard resulting from a no-fault benefit provision? In answering 
this question we develop two hypotheses presented in the following section. 
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CHAPTER 1.3 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
As the WC legislation developed a structure that moved from a tort system to a no fault 
system, both employers and workers found favor in the WC system. The system provided benefit 
to both groups, as workers would be provided timely and dependable benefits, regardless of who 
was at fault; and the employer’s liability was limited. Overall, the WC system and its 
incorporation of experience rating encouraged employers to provide improved workplace safety. 
However, overtime it became apparent the expectation of enhanced safety did not take into 
account factors that would weaken safety, such as moral hazard. Historically, the academic 
literature has documented the information asymmetries between employer and employee. 
Primarily, this moral hazard response has been reported in response to WC benefit changes. 
While the premise behind the WC system incentivizes for enhanced safety, research is 
mixed as to the dominant response to changes in WCB. While one stream of findings suggests 
the moral hazard response dominates the incentive for enhanced safety, others suggest that the 
employers’ incentive to promote workplace safety is greater, as enhanced safety reduces real 
injury cost and overall insurance cost. Motivated by these two viewpoints, and our ability to 
explicitly model the impact of actual safety expenditures on loss cost holding benefits constant, 
we propose two hypotheses: the moral hazard hypothesis and the dominance hypothesis. 
Moral hazard has been tested primarily in the literature by the claims rate response to 
changes in benefits. The consensus in the literature reports that an increase in benefits leads to an 
increase in claims (Dionne & St Michel, 1991; Danzon & Harrington, 2001; Butler and Worrall, 
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1991; Meyer et al., 1995; Kreuger, 1990; Butler et al., 1997; Butler et al., 1998; Butler, 1994; 
Ruser, 1991). The empirical results indicate that claims frequency is directly related to changes 
in WCB and that this relationship is particularly evident in injury claims that are hard to diagnose 
or require a lengthy time away from work. Butler and Worrall (1991) and others, suggest that 
since WCB compensate employees for not working, there is an inherent behavioral incentive to 
magnify the severity of injuries, days away from work, and/or misrepresenting the injury 
incident or location. Based on these finding that WC benefit changes induce moral hazard, we 
hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1- There will be a positive relationship between WCB and loss cost (moral hazard 
hypothesis). 
 
The alternative to Hypothesis 1 is that the changes in WCB will have no impact on 
observed loss cost. Observing no change in loss cost around WC benefit increases would be 
consistent with the absence of moral hazard in our sample. 
Following Hypothesis 1, we examine the relation of changes in safety expenditures on 
changes in loss costs, holding constant benefit changes. Prior studies have differed in their 
findings of the net effect of safety incentives and the relation between benefit increases and 
claims/injury frequency or severity (Butler and Worrall, 1991; Moore and Viscusi, 1989). Butler 
and Worrall, (1991) indicate that while it does seem that work places are becoming safer, the 
moral hazard response to changes in WCB dominates the inherent incentive in the WC system 
for an employer to provide enhanced workplace safety, as loss cost increase regardless of safety 
expenditures. Moore and Viscusi (1989) disagree and document a dramatic safety effect, 
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suggesting that the employers’ incentive to promote and enhance safety dominates the moral 
hazard response to changes in WCB. Taking these competing viewpoints and our ability to 
explicitly model the impact of actual safety expenditures on loss cost holding benefits constant 
we hypothesize the following.   
 
Hypothesis 2- There will be a positive relationship between safety expenditure and loss cost, 
holding benefits constant (dominance hypothesis). 
 
The alternative to Hypothesis 2 is a negative relationship between safety expenditure and 
loss cost, holding benefits constant. Observing a negative relationship would indicate that safety 
is an effective administrative control useful in reducing both real injury cost as well as reducing 
the moral hazard response to changes in WCB. This would be consistent with Chelius, (1976), 
Chelius, (1982) and Moore and Viscusi, (1989) who suggest that the WC systems’ incentive for 
safety is dominant and therefore higher levels of workers' compensation benefits actually save 
employers money by promoting workplace safety. 
We expect evaluating these hypotheses and explicitly modeling actual safety 
expenditures, we will provide the first evidence regarding the impact of actual safety 
expenditures on moral hazard induced by increases in workers’ compensation benefits. 
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CHAPTER 1.4 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
A licensed national WC insurer provided data including policy
1
, claims
2
, underwriting
3
, 
and safety expenditure
4
 data, at a policy level (the identities of the insured were omitted from the 
data). The total sample included 99,824 policies, over a 13 year period, from 1995 to 2007. Our 
current study incorporated the number of policies per year, written premium, aggregate payroll, 
safety expenditures per policy, claims count, loss cost, experience rating (EMOD) factor at the 
beginning of the policy year, and expected loss rate (ELR) factors for each of the governing class 
codes reflected in the data sample. Supplementing the policy, claims, and underwriting data, is 
state specific WC disability benefits data across 23 states
5
.
                                                 
1
 Policy Number, Policy Year, Policy Month, Policy Quarter, Policy Size, Policy State, Line of Business, 
Voluntary/Assigned, Exposure State, Gov Class Code, Class Code, Gov Class Description, Gov Class Group, SCI 
Code, Hazard Group (1-4), Hazard Group (A-G), Payroll, Premium, Earned Premium, Enforced Premium, 
Uncollected Premium, Premium Incurred,  Deductable, ELR, EMOD, Renewal, Loss Cost, Bill Frequency, Bill 
Type, Policy Status, Date Effective, Date Cancelled, Date Expired 
 
2
 Policy Number, Policy Year, Claims Number, Loss Year, Accident State, Jurisdiction State, Development Month, 
ALAE Incurred, ALAE Paid, ALAE Reserve, Indemnity Incurred, Indemnity Paid, Indemnity Reserve, Medical 
Incurred, Medical Paid, Medical Reserve, Date of Loss, Injury Cause, Injury Type, Claims Size, Closed Status, 
Body Part, Cause of Loss 
 
3
 Policy Number, Policy Year, Waiver of Subrogation, Employers Limited Liability, Deductable Credit, Misc 
Factors Applied, Experience Modification, Schedule Rating Credit, Managed Care Credit, Safety Credit, Contractor 
Credit, Other Credit, Premium Discount, Expense Constant, TRIA Premium 
 
4
 Policy Number, Policy Year, Safety Policy, Overhead Cranes, Accident Investigation, Personal Lift devices, Blood 
Bourne Pathogens, Personal Protective Equipment, Confined Space Entry, Respiratory, DOT Substance Abuse,  
Return to Work Program, Drug Sampling, Safety Training, Electrical, Safety Inspections, Fall Protection, Safety 
Meeting Reporting, Fire Protection and Training, Scaffolding, Forklift, Power Tooling, Slip, Trip, Fall, Hazard 
Communication, Stairways and Ladders, Hearing Conservation, Trenching, Housekeeping, Job Safety Analysis, 
Ergonomics, Human Factors, Vehicle Safety, Lockout/Tagout, Machine Guarding, Workplace Security/Violence, 
Hoist 
 
5
  AK, AL,AR,FL,GA,IA,IL,IN,KS,KY,LA,MD,MN,MO,MS,NC,OK,PA,SC,TN,TX,VA,WI 
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Testing the moral hazard and the dominance hypotheses, we examine the relation of changes in 
loss cost to changes in WC disability benefits, as well as the relation between changes in loss 
cost and safety expenditures, holding benefits constant. In testing these hypotheses we follow 
previous literature in defining the dependent and independent control variables. The following 
section documents the variables. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Loss Cost: The actual cost of indemnity payments and allocated loss adjustment expenses. Loss 
costs do not include overhead costs or profit loadings.  
 
Independent Variables 
WCB: Previous analyses have utilized a range of measures for WCB, including the weekly wage 
replacement rate (Moore and Viscusi, 1989; Chelius, 1982), weekly benefits (Ruser, 1985), and 
annual payments by industry (Butler, 1994). In most cases, benefits for the most frequent type of 
claim, temporary total disability, have been used as a proxy for all types of benefits, including 
those for temporary total, permanent total, and permanent partial disabilities, and for fatality 
benefits. Viscusi and Moore (1989) documented the high correlations among the various benefit 
categories that make separation of their effects difficult and indicated the benefit measure using 
the TTD category is an appropriate measure. 
 
Safety Expenditure: Safety expenditures are the dollar amount spent on the comprehensive safety 
programs associated with a particular policy. This data is unique to our data sample, as pervious 
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literature has used changes in injury frequency and severity as proxies for safety, and not an 
actual safety measure.  
 
Payroll: Payroll provides a measure of exposure risk, although an imperfect one. Payroll differs 
across job class and from employee to employee. However, payroll is the base exposure unit that 
is used for most WC insurance products and is the best available proxy for the number of 
workers exposed to injury.  
 
Premium: The amount of earned premium recorded for a policy at the time it is issued. Butler & 
Worrall (1991) suggest that for some firms the relationship between the loss cost and the size of 
the premium will be very close.  
 
Claims Count: Claims count is the number of claims per policy in a given year. We postulate that 
the level of claims should be a function of the number employees (exposure risk), the type of 
injuries that the employees are exposed to (average risk), and the relative safety record of the 
employer (relative risk). 
 
Expected Loss Rate (ELR): The average employment-based risk is proxied by the ELR for the 
governing class code of each employer. The governing class code is not a precise measure of the 
average loss exposure because it reflects the type of business rather than the direct job-related 
activities, but it is suggested to provide a practical estimate of average risk for the firm. The 
governing class code is the primary business of the employer within the state that gets classified, 
not the separate employments, occupations or operations within the governing type.  
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Experience Modification Factors (EMOD): The EMOD for each employer provides a measure of 
relative risk, taking into account the types of employment-related risk present in the employers’ 
business process. The EMOD in our sample was provided by the insurer
6,7
. Employers with 
higher EMOD factors would be presumed to have greater average loss experience after allowing 
for the type of business. Experience rating factors change from year to year as the loss 
experience of the employer is acknowledged in the pricing formula. As an employer’s successful 
safety efforts lead to lower loss costs, the improved safety record is identified and included in the 
rating formula, resulting in the price of the insurance premium to drop. We would expect to see 
that increases in the experience modification factor over a period of time would lead to lower 
loss costs if a firm reduces occupational injuries. We therefore include the change in the EMOD 
factor and ELR to measure the relationship between increases or decreases of the claims 
experience and loss cost year to year. 
Table 1 presents statistics that describe our sample.  Panel A presents the policy 
characteristics and shows that on average the sample has 7679 policies per year. Average payroll 
and premium per policy are $27,684 and $392,511, respectively. The average safety expenditure 
per policy is $612. Panel B. presents the claims and underwriting characteristics. As expected the 
claims count is proportional related to the policy count. Average claims count in the sample is 
                                                 
6
 Class rates of employers meeting minimum premium requirements are modified based on their relative claims 
experience over the previous three years. In the United States, the basic formula is: EMOD = (ALR – ELR)/ELR. 
Where: EMOD = experience rating modification factor, ALR = actual loss ratio, ELR = actuarially computed 
expected loss ratio (assigned by class). 
 
7
 The EMOD is multiplied times an employer’s manual premium (the employers’ covered payroll multiplied times 
the assigned classification rate). If the EMOD is less than 1.0, then the employer’s experience-adjusted premium is 
less than its manual premium. Vice versa, if the EMOD is greater than 1.0 then the employer’s experience-adjusted 
premium is greater than its manual premium. Employers receive an EMOD greater than 1.0 if their claims 
experience is significantly worse than the average for their particular classification and vice versa. The 
understanding is that experience rating adjusts for firm-specific risk variation within a given classification.  
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11,047 with an average loss cost of $11,572. The EMOD and ELR are fairly stable over time 
0.939 and 1.22 respectively. These values would be expected if the insurer was doing an 
appropriate job of adjusting the insurance pricing based on past loss exposures and 
classifications based on class codes of the job exposures. Panel C presents the benefit data 
assigned be each of the 23 states in our policy sample. The average WCB is $579 with a 
minimum benefit of $102. 
Table 2 presents statistics that describe the change in variables from year to year. Similar 
to Table 1 panel A, B, and C present changes in policy, claims/underwriting, and benefit 
characteristics, respectively. Policy count, payroll, premium, and safety expenditures increase 
from year to year by 6%, 1%, 18%, and 2%, respectively. Claims counts decreased by 6%, while 
loss cost increased by an average of 4%. EMOD and ELR were relatively constant with .5% and 
1% changes over time, respectively. Lastly, consistent with changes in benefits reported in 
previous literature the change in benefits over our time period were approximately 4% across 
max and min WCB and max death benefits. 
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CHAPTER 1.5 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
In answering our proposed question: does the safety effect of experience rating dominate 
the effect of employee moral hazard resulting from a no-fault benefit provision; we incorporate 
univariate and multivariate tests. We first run a univariate analysis of the size of the change in 
benefits and its relationship to change in average loss cost and average safety expenditures. We 
calculate and sort benefit changes into quartiles by average change size and run a pair-wise t-test 
of changes in the mean. 
Our multivariate analysis is performed with panel data models which allows for 
regression analysis with both a policy and year dimension. We test whether a fixed or random 
effects model is appropriate using a Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978). The random 
effects assumption is that the individual specific effects are uncorrelated with the independent 
variables, where as the fixed effect assumption is that the individual specific effect is correlated 
with the independent variables. We find that the random effect assumption does not hold and the 
random effects model is not consistent. We examine the relation between safety expenditures and 
loss cost holding WCB constant, ceteris paribus, using the panel data fixed effect model: 
 
ΔAvg Loss Costi,t-t+1= β0 +  β1ΔPayrolli,t-1,t + β2ΔPremiumi,t-1,t + β3ΔClaims Counti,t-1,t + 
β4ΔExperience Ratingi,t-1,t + β5ΔExpected Loss Ratei,t-1,t + β6ΔWCB i,t-1,t + β7ΔAvg Safety 
Expenditurei,t-1,t + β8ΔWCBi,t-1,t x ΔAvg Safety Expenditure i,t-1,t+ εi (1) 
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The dependent variable is the change in loss cost (ΔAvg Loss Costi,t-t+1 )from year t to 
t+1.  Following previous literature which documents factors that influence loss cost, we include 
the changes in: aggregate payroll (ΔPayrolli,t-1,t ), earned premium (ΔPremiumi,t-1,t), number of 
claims (ΔClaims Counti,t-1,t), experience rating (ΔExperience Ratingi,t-1,t), and the expected loss 
rate (ΔExpected Loss Ratei,t-1,t).  Following the consensus in the literature, we include the change 
in the WC disability benefits (ΔWCBi,t-1,t) to test the moral hazard hypothesis.  Unique to our 
sample is the change in safety expenditures (ΔAvg Safety Expenditurei,t-1,t), which gives us the 
ability to explicitly test the impact of safety on loss cost.  The variables of interest is the 
interaction variable between WC benefit changes and safety expenditures (ΔWCBi,t-1,t x ΔAvg 
Safety Expenditure i,t-1,t). This variable directly test the dominance hypothesis and would suggest  
if moral hazard dominates the safety incentives for an employer inherent in the WC system, the 
estimate would be to be significantly positive.   
  We further extend our analysis by taking the multivariate approach in equation 1, within 
sub samples of our data for hard to diagnose injuries and claims of a lengthened duration. We 
follow Butler et al. (1997) and define hard to diagnose injuries consist of back injuries and lower 
and upper extremity sprains and strains. Further, we sort loss cost into quartiles by elapsed 
claims duration of less than 6 months, 6 months to 12 months, 12 months to 24 months, greater 
than 24 months.   
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CHAPTER 1.6 
RESULTS 
We begin our analysis by examining the moral hazard response to benefit changes and 
the influence of safety expenditures on that relationship using both univariate and multivariate 
tests.  We also test the relation using a sub sample of claims characteristics that are indicated to 
be influenced by moral hazard.   
Table 3 presents the findings of our univariate analysis of the size of the change in 
benefits and its relationship to change in average loss cost and average safety expenditures. The 
average change in benefits in our sample of 23 states is 3.89%. Quartile 1 is a change of less than 
1.17%, Quartile 2 a change of greater than 1.17% and less than 3.89%, Quartile 3 a change of 
greater than 3.89% and less than 5.83%, and Quartile 4 is a benefit change of greater than 5.83%. 
The univariate analysis indicates that the larger the change in benefits induces a greater change 
in both loss cost and safety expenditures. These findings are consistent with previous literature 
suggesting that as WCB increase there is both a moral hazard response (Butler and Worrall, 
1991) as well as the potential for enhance workplace safety (Moore and Viscusi, 1989).  
Results for our multivariate analysis testing the moral hazard and dominance hypotheses 
are presented in Table 4. We postulate that the change in loss cost should be a function of the 
number employees (exposure risk-payroll), the type of injuries that the employees are exposed to 
(average risk-ELR), the relative safety record of the employer (relative risk-EMOD), disability 
benefits, and safety expenditure. Additionally, in the presence of a moral hazard response, we 
would expect that a change in the WC benefit would be positively related to a change in loss 
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cost. Furthermore, if safety is generally beneficial, we would expect that a change in safety 
expenditures would have negative relationship to loss cost. 
 
Table 5 columns [1] through [4] indicate our parameter estimates for the change in 
payroll, premiums, claims count, EMOD, ELR are consistent with the expected signs. A change 
in payroll has a positive and significant relationship to changes in loss cost, which is expected 
due to increased exposure levels. Additionally, the change in claims count has a positive and 
significant relationship as expected due to increase in the number of claims would increase loss 
cost. Consistent with the literature, changes in EMOD has a negative and significant relationship 
with change in loss cost. If the average firm’s WC costs are directly affected by the change in its 
EMOD factor, this would lead to a significant safety effect, and would expect to see an inverse 
relationship between changes in the EMOD and loss cost. This finding is consistent with the 
notion that as an employer improves the work place safety and reduces injury rates/severity, 
there is a modification to the pricing of the premium based on past loss history. ELR exhibits a 
positive and significant relationship to loss cost, indicating as the average risk of the firm 
increases there is a direct impact on loss cost.  
Specifically, Table 5 column [1] that there is a strong positive relationship between 
changes in WCB and changes in loss cost. We interpret these findings to be consistent with the 
consensus in the literature regarding a moral hazard response to changes in WCB (Butler and 
Worrall, 1991; Meyer et al., 1995; Kreuger, 1990; Butler et al., 1997; Butler et al., 1998; Butler, 
1994; Ruser, 1991). As such, we fail to reject the moral hazard hypothesis.  In column [2], we 
find a negative and significant relationship between changes in safety expenditures and changes 
in loss cost.  The results in column [2] suggest that increases in safety expenditures have a 
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positive impact on loss cost. Column [3] provides the first direct comparison of actual safety 
expenditures and the influence on the moral hazard response to changes in benefits on loss cost.  
 
Prior findings have inferred the net effect of safety incentives by estimating the relation 
between benefit increases and claims/injury frequency or severity (Butler and Worrall, 1991; 
Moore and Viscusi, 1989), while not explicitly modeled the impact of actual safety expenditures. 
Our findings in column [3] provide initial indications that while the moral hazard exist, increases 
in safety expenditures reduce the moral hazard response typically seen around changes in 
disability benefits. This result is of primary importance as it indicates that the safety incentive for 
an employer potentially dominates the moral hazard response of an employee. In addition, 
column [4] reports on the relation of changes in safety expenditures on changes in loss costs, 
holding constant benefit changes. This result suggests that there is a dominating safety effect 
over that of the moral hazard response. While the moral hazard response is not absolved, there is 
a reduction in the moral hazard response around WC benefit changes. As a result, we reject the 
dominance hypothesis and find support for Chelius (1977), Chelius (1982) and Moore and 
Viscusi (1989) who suggest that the WC systems’ incentive for safety is dominant and therefore 
higher levels of workers' compensation benefits actually save employers money by promoting 
workplace safety. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant. 
The signs of the individual coefficients remain the same, but ΔWCBi,t-1,t, by itself, no longer 
appears to be as significant of an explanatory factor.  This suggests that WCB affects loss cost 
through its interaction with safety expenditures, that is, on the marginal propensity to reduce 
ΔAvg Loss Costi,t-t+1. Using these estimates, we estimate the marginal effect of ΔWCBi,t-1,t upon 
ΔAvg Loss Costi,t-t+1 for three given levels ΔSafety Expendituresi,t-1,t; 0.0537 (25% in our sample), 
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0.0187 (50% in our sample), and 0.0378 (75% in our sample). As such, we expect that a change 
in safety expenditures of 0.0537 will reduce loss cost by .1160, while a change in safety 
expenditures of 0.0187 will reduce loss cost by .1331, and a change in safety expenditures of 
0.0378 will reduce loss cost by .1238, all other factors held constant. These findings provide 
evidence that there is a strong incentive to engage in safety practices, not only to reduce loss cost 
but also reduce the moral hazard response to changes in benefits. 
We further extend our analysis by examining the relation between safety expenditures 
and loss cost holding WCB constant, in a sub sample of claims related to hard to diagnose 
injuries, fatalities, and claims of a lengthened duration.  Table 6 presents the summary statistics 
related to the sub sample of hard to diagnose injury claims and the length of claims development.  
Our multivariate results are presented in Table 7. Column [1] provides the results when 
examining a sub sample of hard to diagnose injury claims. Our results show, similar to that of the 
complete sample, while the moral hazard response is not absolved, there is a reduction in the 
moral hazard response around WC benefit through changes in safety expenditures. This result 
suggests that there is a dominating safety effect over that of the moral hazard response, 
specifically when examining hard to diagnose injury claims. Columns [2]-[5] present results 
when partitioning the complete sample into quartiles based on claims development. These 
partitions are < 6 months, 6-12 months, 12-24 months, and > 24 months.  We find that for low 
claims development durations, there was not a moral hazard response to benefit changes, 
whereas moral hazard was reported as claims duration increased. Of particular interest was the 
finding that changes in safety expenditures had a positive impact on the reduction of real injuries, 
while at the same type reducing the documented moral hazard response to benefit changes. 
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CHAPTER 1.7 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study indicate that changes in safety expenditures both reduce the level of loss 
cost, while reducing the level of moral hazard response to changes in disability benefits. The 
latter finding is of primary interest as it supports existing literature indicating that safety has a 
beneficial effect on WC cost. More importantly, while previous literature indicate that the moral 
hazard effect dominates the safety incentive of an employer, the current findings support the 
notion that safety incentives actually may reduce the moral hazard response generated by 
changes in benefits.  
Our initial analysis suggests that EMOD and ELR do have the intended effect of 
encouraging employers to reduce loss cost. More specifically, our analysis yields supporting 
evidence that increases in EMOD factors lead to decreases the loss cost in subsequent years. We 
also find that employer size, as measured by payroll, is positively related to loss cost, while 
premium has no direct statistical relation to the reduction of loss cost. Furthermore, as claims 
increase the results indicate an increase in loss cost, which is consistent with the notion that the 
greater number of claims increases the loss cost levels of the firm. 
Our study poses and addresses an important empirical question: Does the safety effect of 
experience rating dominate the effect of employee moral hazard resulting from a no-fault benefit 
provision? Using our unique dataset we are able to estimate the impact of changes in safety 
expenditures on changes in loss costs, holding constant benefit changes. Subsequently, we show 
that safety expenditures play a positive role in reducing the moral hazard response to changes in 
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WCB. Prior studies have inferred the net effect of safety incentives by estimating the relation 
between benefit increases and claims/injury frequency or severity (Butler and Worrall, 1991; 
Moore and Viscusi, 1989). However, these studies have not explicitly modeled the impact of 
actual safety expenditures.  
While rising claims costs could lead one to the mistaken belief that the WC system does 
not provide an incentive to reduce real injuries, or that an employee's incentive to bear more real 
risk is stronger than an employer's incentive to reduce injuries, the current results indicate that 
the employer’s incentive for safety is not unfounded. While the evidence is virtually unanimous 
in previous studies showing that employee effects dominate, the current study indicates that 
while the moral hazard response is not eliminated, changes in safety expenditures significantly 
reduce the moral hazard response. Our findings provide some of the first evidence supporting the 
idea that safety expenditures are beneficial and have a positive impact on reducing both loss cost 
and the moral hazard response to changes in benefits.   
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Table 1. The table presents means and definitions for each of the variables. 
Variable Definition Mean
Policy Count Number of policies  7679
Premium Dollar amount of premium recorded for a policy at the time it is issued 27,684$           
Payroll Measure of exposure risk proxied by aggregate payroll per policy 392,511$         
Safety Expenditure Dollar amount of comprehensive safety program per policy 612$                
Claims Count Number of claims per policy 11,047
Loss Cost Incurred loss cost over the subsequent year per policy 11,572$           
EMOD* Measure of relative risk based on the policy holders business process 0.939
ELR* Measure of employment-based risk for the governing class code of each policy 1.22
Max Disability Benefit** Weekly maximum disability rate within the temporary total disability category 579$                
Min Disability Benefit** Weekly minimum disability rate within the temporary total disability category 102$                
Max Death Benefit** Maximum death benefit 579$                
**Weekly rate schedules based on the exposure state (N=23) of the policy
* Factors have been calculated in the private data sample. Calculations are footnoted in the methods section.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Panel A. provides the policy specific characteristics. Policy count details the number of policy in the sample. Premium 
is the amount of premium recorded for a policy at the time it is issued. Payroll provides a measure of exposure risk 
proxied by aggregate payroll. Safety expenditures are the dollar amount spent on the comprehensive safety programs 
associated with a particular policy. Panel B. reports the claims/underwriting characteristics of our sample. Claims 
count is the number of claims per policy in a given year. The average employment-based risk is proxied by the ELR 
for the governing class code of each employer. The EMOD factor for each employer provides a measure of relative 
risk, taking into account the types of employment-related risk present in the employers’ business process. Panel C. 
reports the benefit characteristics. Maximum benefit is a measure using the weekly maximum disability rate within the 
temporary total disability category. The benefit data is recorded from each of the 23 states (in our sample) rate 
schedules based on the exposure state of the policy. Minimum and maximum death benefits are reported the same as 
maximum benefits. 
 
 
Panel B. Claims/Underwriting Characteristics    
Year Claims Count Avg Loss Cost EMOD ELR 
    25% 50% 75%     
1995 3616 2298 9527 269333 0.941 1.23 
1996 4926 2069 7418 168491 0.928 0.95 
1997 11326 3839 6171 405194 0.936 0.89 
1998 20436 2495 4651 382278 0.943 0.94 
1999 33169 1802 5412 505592 0.918 0.91 
2000 22783 2759 6896 585665 0.967 0.96 
2001 9253 3162 8960 317005 0.941 1.16 
2002 6229 3347 11400 771112 0.938 1.38 
2003 5926 3094 14099 847534 0.953 1.43 
2004 6605 3421 16937 339762 0.926 1.50 
2005 6759 5188 20355 647835 0.937 1.52 
2006 6301 3144 16859 456396 0.934 1.51 
2007 6283 3296 21747 521461 0.944 1.48 
Mean 11047 3070 11572 478281 0.939 1.220 
 
Panel A. Policy Characteristics         
Year Policy Count Avg Premium Avg Payroll Avg Safety Expenditure 
    25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 
1995 2229 8755 28811 65445 889 1289 3106 217 598 1392 
1996 3350 8717 20068 65364 3708 10162 31515 230 432 794 
1997 6201 9162 18097 67106 166770 310139 1175025 241 450 563 
1998 9632 8736 16404 68958 211185 450642 2176476 231 420 625 
1999 14964 8447 16937 70223 242267 549132 2286795 261 517 833 
2000 13447 8331 18516 68293 194728 506901 1877192 284 533 999 
2001 8457 8294 21644 61583 117263 363780 1163457 292 541 1195 
2002 6480 8374 27886 65706 98094 383350 995683 311 611 1672 
2003 6454 9070 33928 67138 102806 446457 969018 326 677 2024 
2004 6673 9232 37415 70697 106445 492783 975322 371 743 2300 
2005 6954 9912 40806 72458 124537 532784 994184 386 792 2648 
2006 7226 9310 40979 70618 118238 544346 974645 418 816 2936 
2007 7757 8393 38406 67414 107075 510875 948698 426 829 3371 
Mean 7679 8826 27684 67769 122616 392511 1120855 307 612 1643 
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Panel C. Disability Benefits Characteristics       
Year Avg Max Benefit Avg Min Benefit 
  25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 
1995 326 444 525 68 83 126 
1996 338 462 540 71 85 130 
1997 351 491 553 74 89 136 
1998 366 507 573 77 91 140 
1999 383 542 602 81 96 146 
2000 401 570 631 84 99 151 
2001 417 590 668 87 103 156 
2002 432 591 700 90 107 161 
2003 440 628 722 93 108 167 
2004 449 641 740 96 110 173 
2005 467 661 770 99 114 179 
2006 483 680 801 102 117 188 
2007 510 717 848 107 122 194 
Mean 413 579 667 87 102 157 
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Table 3. Changes in summary statistics 
Panel A. provides the policy specific characteristics, panel B reports the claims/underwriting characteristics, and panel 
C reports benefit characteristics. The variables are defined as the change in the summary statistics variables from table 
1.Policy count details the number of policy in the sample. Premium is the amount of premium recorded for a policy at 
the time it is issued. Payroll provides a measure of exposure risk proxied by aggregate payroll. Safety expenditures are 
the dollar amount spent on the comprehensive safety programs associated with a particular policy. Panel B. reports the 
claims/underwriting characteristics of our sample. Claims count is the number of claims per policy in a given year. 
The average employment-based risk is proxied by the ELR for the governing class code of each employer. The EMOD 
factor for each employer provides a measure of relative risk, taking into account the types of employment-related risk 
present in the employers’ business process. Panel C. reports the benefit characteristics. Maximum benefit is a measure 
using the weekly maximum disability rate within the temporary total disability category. The benefit data is recorded 
from each of the 23 states (in our sample) rate schedules based on the exposure state of the policy. Minimum and 
maximum death benefits are reported the same as maximum benefits. 
Panel A. Changes in Policy Characteristics        
 
ΔPolicy 
Count ΔAvg Premium ΔAvg Payroll Safety Expenditures 
Year  25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 50% 75% 
1995 - - - - - - - - 
1996 0.3346 -0.0044 -0.4357 -0.0012 0.7602 0.8732 
-
0.3843 
-
0.7531 
1997 0.4598 0.0486 -0.1089 0.0260 0.9778 0.9672 0.0400 
-
0.4098 
1998 0.3562 -0.0488 -0.1032 0.0269 0.2103 0.3118 
-
0.0714 0.0985 
1999 0.3563 -0.0342 0.0315 0.0180 0.1283 0.1794 0.1876 0.2505 
2000 -0.1128 -0.0139 0.0853 -0.0283 -0.2441 -0.0833 0.0300 0.1662 
2001 -0.5900 -0.0045 0.1445 -0.1090 -0.6606 -0.3934 0.0148 0.1639 
2002 -0.3051 0.0096 0.2238 0.0627 -0.1954 0.0510 0.1146 0.2851 
2003 -0.0040 0.0767 0.1781 0.0213 0.0458 0.1414 0.0975 0.1736 
2004 0.0328 0.0175 0.0932 0.0503 0.0342 0.0940 0.0888 0.1203 
2005 0.0404 0.0686 0.0831 0.0243 0.1453 0.0751 0.0619 0.1314 
2006 0.0376 -0.0647 0.0042 -0.0261 -0.0533 0.0212 0.0294 0.0980 
2007 0.0685 -0.1093 -0.0670 -0.0475 -0.1043 -0.0655 0.0157 0.1290 
Mean 0.0562 -0.0049 0.0107 0.0015 0.0870 0.1810 0.0187 0.0378 
  
 
ΔClaims 
Count ΔAvg Loss Cost ΔEMOD ΔELR 
Year  25% 50% 75%     
1995 - - - -   
1996 0.2659 -0.1107 -0.2843 -0.5985 -0.014 -0.30 
1997 0.5651 0.4611 -0.2021 0.5842 0.009 -0.07 
1998 0.4458 -0.5387 -0.3268 -0.0599 0.007 0.05 
1999 0.3839 -0.3846 0.1406 0.2439 -0.027 -0.03 
2000 -0.4559 0.3469 0.2152 0.1367 0.051 0.05 
2001 -1.4622 0.1275 0.2304 -0.8475 -0.028 0.18 
2002 -0.4855 0.0553 0.2140 0.5889 -0.003 0.16 
2003 -0.0511 -0.0818 0.1914 0.0902 0.016 0.03 
2004 0.1028 0.0956 0.1676 -1.4945 -0.029 0.05 
2005 0.0228 0.3406 0.1679 0.4755 0.012 0.01 
2006 -0.0727 -0.6501 -0.2074 -0.4195 -0.003 0.00 
2007 -0.0029 0.0461 0.2248 0.1248 0.011 -0.02 
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Mean -0.0620 -0.0244 0.0443 -0.0980 0.00002 0.01 
 
Panel C. Changes in Disability Benefits Characteristics      
 ΔAvg Max Benefit ΔAvg Min Benefit ΔAvg Death Benefit 
Year 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 
1995 - - - - - - - - - 
1996 0.0355 0.0374 0.0278 0.0380 0.0256 0.0308 0.0355 0.0374 0.0278 
1997 0.0370 0.0597 0.0235 0.0366 0.0423 0.0441 0.0370 0.0597 0.0235 
1998 0.0410 0.0323 0.0349 0.0447 0.0311 0.0286 0.0410 0.0323 0.0349 
1999 0.0444 0.0643 0.0482 0.0481 0.0446 0.0411 0.0444 0.0643 0.0482 
2000 0.0449 0.0491 0.0460 0.0374 0.0372 0.0331 0.0449 0.0491 0.0460 
2001 0.0384 0.0335 0.0554 0.0327 0.0346 0.0321 0.0384 0.0335 0.0554 
2002 0.0347 0.0007 0.0457 0.0301 0.0372 0.0311 0.0347 0.0007 0.0457 
2003 0.0182 0.0595 0.0305 0.0307 0.0087 0.0359 0.0182 0.0595 0.0305 
2004 0.0200 0.0206 0.0243 0.0313 0.0221 0.0347 0.0200 0.0206 0.0243 
2005 0.0385 0.0307 0.0390 0.0377 0.0316 0.0335 0.0385 0.0307 0.0390 
2006 0.0331 0.0273 0.0387 0.0279 0.0250 0.0479 0.0331 0.0273 0.0387 
2007 0.0529 0.0519 0.0554 0.0435 0.0438 0.0309 0.0529 0.0519 0.0554 
Mean 0.0366 0.0389 0.0391 0.0365 0.0320 0.0353 0.0366 0.0389 0.0391 
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Table 4. Univariate Analysis of the Size of a Benefit Change on Change in Loss Cost and Change in Safety 
Expenditure 
Reported are the findings of our univariate analysis of the size of the change in benefits and its relationship to change 
in average loss cost and average safety expenditures. We calculate and sort benefit changes into quartiles by average 
change size. The average change in benefits in our sample of 23 states is 3.89%. Quartile 1 is a change of less than 
1.17%, Quartile 2 a change of greater than 1.17% and less than 3.89%, Quartile 3 a change of greater than 3.89% and 
less than 5.83%, and Quartile 4 is a benefit change of greater than 5.83%.   P-values are reported in parentheses.  
***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
ΔAvg Max Benefit Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
  (< 1.17%) (>1.17%, <3.89%) (>3.89%, <5.83%) (>5.83%) 
ΔAvg Loss Cost 0.0406 0.0687 0.1143 0.1943 
     
ΔAvg Safety Expenditures 0.0323 0.0709 0.1287 0.2064 
          
Difference Difference Difference Difference 
Q2-Q1 Q3-Q2 Q4-Q3 Q4-Q1 
0.0281 0.0456 0.08*** 0.1537*** 
  (0.006) (0.002) 
0.0386 0.0578 0.0777** 0.1741*** 
    (0.011) (0.000) 
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Table 5. Regression Results 
The table reports the results from estimating the following equation. 
 
ΔAvg Loss Costi,t-t+1= β0 +  β1ΔPayrolli,t-1,t + β2ΔPremiumi,t-1,t + β3ΔClaims Counti,t-1,t + β4ΔExperience Ratingi,t-1,t + 
β5ΔExpected Loss Ratei,t-1,t + β6ΔAvg Max Benefit i,t-1,t + β7ΔAvg Safety Expenditurei,t-1,t + β8ΔAvg Max Benefit i,t-1,t x 
ΔAvg Safety Expenditure i,t-1,t+ εi (1) 
 
 
Our dependent variable is the change in loss cost for each claim in the sample in the subsequent year. ΔAvg Loss 
Costi,t-t+1=the average loss cost over the subsequent year. ΔPayrolli,t-1,t is the change in payroll from the prior year to 
the current year. ΔPremiumi,t-1,t is the change in the premium from the prior year to the current year. ΔClaims 
Counti,t-1,t is the change in the claims from the prior year to the current year. ΔExperience Ratingi,t-1,t is the change in 
the EMOD factor from the prior year to  the  current year. ΔExpected Loss Ratei,t-1,t is the change in the ELR factor 
from the prior year to the  current year. ΔAvg Max Benefit i,t-1,t is the change in the maximum WC benefit from the 
prior year to the  current year. ΔAvg Safety Expenditurei,t-1,t is the change in the safety expenditures per policy from 
the prior  year to the  current year. P-values are reported in parentheses.  ***,**,* represent statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
  
  ΔAvg Loss Cost     
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
     
Intercept 0.2974*** 0.3143*** 0.3019*** 0.2879*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔPayroll 0.1979*** 0.1884*** 0.1817*** 0.1892*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔPremium 0.2216 0.2109 0.1984 0.2201 
 (0.225) (0.193) (0.248) (0.316) 
ΔClaims Count 0.3597*** 0.3016*** 0.2944*** 0.2717*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔExperience Rating -0.1856*** -0.1687*** -0.1536*** -0.1461*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔExpected Loss Rate 0.0997* 0.0904* 0.0811* 0.0806* 
 (0.091) (0.078) (0.061) (0.104) 
ΔAvg Max Benefit 0.2085***  0.1638* 0.1422* 
 (0.000)  (0.087) (0.094) 
ΔAvg Safety Expenditure  -0.3741*** -0.3421*** -0.3318*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔAvg Max Benefit x ΔAvg Safety Expenditure   -0.4866*** 
        (0.000) 
Adj R
2
 0.1672 0.1944 0.2221 0.2593 
Observations 82,704 82,704 82,704 82,704 
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Table 6. Summary statistics from hard to diagnose claims and claims duration. 
Panel A. provides hard to diagnose claims characteristics. Claims count is the number of hard to diagnose claims per 
policy in a given year. Average loss cost is the average actual cost of indemnity payments and allocated loss 
adjustment expenses. Panel B presents total claims and average loss cost portioned by the length of duration of a 
closed claim. 
Panel A. Hard to Diagnose Injuries: Claims Characteristics
Year Claims Count Avg Loss Cost
1995 345 14,814                
1996 722 8,634                  
1997 1,297 5,356                  
1998 2,723 3,827                  
1999 4,912 3,588                  
2000 6,203 3,781                  
2001 3,822 5,776                  
2002 1,766 7,049                  
2003 1,312 11,533                
2004 1,304 14,645                
2005 1,351 19,606                
2006 1,506 13,133                
2007 1,325 15,641                
Mean 2,199 9,799
Panel B. Duration of Claims Develeopment to Closing
Year Claims Count Avg Loss Cost Claims Count Avg Loss Cost Claims Count Avg Loss Cost Claims Count Avg Loss Cost
1995 85                      9,368                  943                11,595                1,905                 10,880                2,191                 10,163                
1996 185                    7,688                  1,651             9,339                  2,797                 8,345                  3,229                 7,648                  
1997 312                    2,776                  3,188             6,454                  5,671                 6,334                  6,627                 6,435                  
1998 694                    2,032                  6,577             4,203                  11,207               4,443                  12,859               4,473                  
1999 1,250                 2,280                  11,641           4,456                  19,837               4,741                  22,485               4,950                  
2000 1,610                 1,934                  13,626           5,120                  21,020               6,376                  21,336               6,466                  
2001 1,187                 3,701                  7,729             7,308                  10,937               8,179                  11,917               8,443                  
2002 550                    4,821                  3,908             7,490                  6,145                 9,226                  6,875                 9,646                  
2003 404                    7,318                  2,848             11,633                4,569                 13,338                5,193                 13,154                
2004 345                    10,301                3,016             14,666                5,029                 15,302                5,640                 15,502                
2005 374                    6,391                  3,001             20,193                5,063                 18,956                5,706                 18,947                
2006 406                    6,054                  3,255             14,615                5,132                 15,228                5,779                 15,691                
2007 396                    6,748                  3,159             18,634                4,973                 20,161                5,616                 20,706                
Mean 600 5,493 4,965 10,439 8,022 10,885 8,881 10,940
12-24 Months > 24 Months< 6 Months 6-12 months
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Table 7. Regression Results 
The table reports the results from estimating the following equation. 
 
ΔAvg Loss Costi,t-t+1= β0 +  β1ΔPayrolli,t-1,t + β2ΔPremiumi,t-1,t + β3ΔClaims Counti,t-1,t + β4ΔExperience Ratingi,t-1,t + 
β5ΔExpected Loss Ratei,t-1,t + β6ΔAvg Max Benefit i,t-1,t + β7ΔAvg Safety Expenditurei,t-1,t + β8ΔAvg Max Benefit i,t-1,t x 
ΔAvg Safety Expenditure i,t-1,t+ εi (1) 
 
Our model specifications are identical to that of Table 5. Column 1 presents the results in our sub sample of hard to 
diagnose (HTD) injuries. Columns 2-5 partition the sub sample into the length of claims development till claims 
closing. These partitions are < 6months, 6-12 months, 12-24 months, and > 24 months. P-values are reported in 
parentheses.  ***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
  ΔAvg Loss Cost     
   [HTD] [< 6] [6-12] [12-24] [> 24] 
      Intercept 0.4617*** 0.2784*** 0.2893*** 0.2774*** 0.2956*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔPayroll 0.2613*** 0.3106*** 0.2746*** 0.2459*** 0.2827*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔPremium 0.1487* 0.2561 0.2713 0.2558 0.2763 
 
(0.094) (0.263) (0.184) (0.401) (0.289) 
ΔClaims Count 0.2129*** 0.2591*** 0.2743*** 0.2999*** 0.3358*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔExperience Rating -0.1487*** -0.2103*** -0.1648*** -0.1788*** -0.2013*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔExpected Loss Rate 0.1171** 0.0841** 0.0976* 0.0755** 0.0717** 
 
(0.047) (0.034) (0.082) (0.038) (0.027) 
ΔAvg Max Benefit 0.2179* 0.1684 0.1623* 0.1894* 0.1907* 
 
(0.068) (0.214) (0.086) (0.073) (0.084) 
ΔAvg Safety Expenditure -0.2641*** -0.1867** -0.2106** -0.2188*** -0.2468*** 
 
(0.000) (0.032) (0.047) (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔAvg Max Benefit x ΔAvg 
Safety Expenditure -0.3941*** -0.2737** -0.2943** -0.3449*** -0.4064*** 
 
(0.000) (0.044) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) 
      Adj R
2
  0.2341 0.1483 0.1866 0.2243 0.2497 
Observations 29,844 43,632 38,532 43,452 21,410 
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ESSAY 2:  
INFORMATION AND INSURER FINANCIAL STRENGTH RATINGS: DO SHORT 
SELLERS ANTICIPATE RATINGS CHANGES? 
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CHAPTER 2.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Research regarding the financial strength ratings of insurance companies has received 
recent considerable attention.  Doherty and Phillips (2002) argue that insurers attempt to market 
their financial strength ratings as a signal of the firm’s financial strength.  Pottier and Sommer 
(1999) suggest that investors use financial strength ratings of public insurance companies as 
measures of risk, while Parekh (2006) suggests that insurers with financial strength ratings above 
some specified threshold are more popular than other insurers.  Halek and Eckles (2010) find that 
stock prices of insurance companies tend to move in the direction of ratings changes, particularly 
for unfavorable ratings changes, thus indicating that ratings provide informational value to the 
market.  The purpose of this study is to test whether the price decline precipitated by ratings 
downgrades is anticipated by short sellers, who are found to have an unusual ability to acquire 
private information about future news events that adversely affect stock prices. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) initially conjecture that short sellers are sophisticated 
investors and possess information about future firm performance and the true value of stocks. 
This assertion has been empirically supported by numerous studies that find short selling is 
inversely related to subsequent returns (Senchack and Starks, 1993; Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and 
Swan, 1998; Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran, 2002; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 
2008; Engelberg, Reed, and Riggenberg, 2010; Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004; Christophe, 
Ferri, and Hsieh, 2010). However, observing a negative relation between short selling and 
subsequent returns is not necessarily equivalent to finding short sellers to be privately informed. 
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Short sellers’ ability to predict negative returns may arise from their superior ability to 
process public information.  Indeed, Engelberg et al. (2010) show that the return predictability of 
short sellers is markedly higher on days with information-rich announcements than on non-event 
days; mainly driven by short sellers’ superior ability to process publically available information.  
Therefore, determining whether short sellers are privately informed requires examining short 
selling behavior before an information-rich event.  Christophe et al. (2004) and Christophe et al. 
(2010) examine shorting activity prior to earnings announcements and analyst recommendations, 
respectively, and find that short selling is abnormally high prior to both unfavorable earnings 
announcements and downward analyst recommendation changes. When examining short selling 
around insider sales, Khan and Lu (2008) find abnormal short selling prior to insider sales. These 
previous findings substantiate the assertion short sellers are sophisticated traders around 
information rich events. 
While there is a foundation of research suggesting short sellers are sophisticated; a recent 
stream of literature suggest that short sellers are no more sophisticated prior to informational 
events than other traders (Daske, Richardson, and Tuna, 2005; Boehmer and Wu, 2008; 
Chakrabarty and Shkilko, 2008; Blau and Wade, 2011; Blau and Pinegar, 2010). Daske et al. 
(2005) and Boehmer and Wu (2008), show that short sellers are not able to predict negative 
announcements and instead increase their shorting activity in response to announcements. Blau 
and Wade (2011) find the short-selling patterns surrounding both analyst downgrades and 
upgrades are remarkably symmetric indicating that short sellers during the pre-recommendation 
period are not unusually informed about the direction of upcoming recommendation changes. 
Their findings indicate that short selling prior to analyst recommendations is more likely 
speculative than informed. Blau and Pingear (2010) find that short selling surges after both 
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positive and negative announcements and that short selling immediately before negative 
announcements is less able to predict future returns than short selling during more normal times. 
Chakrabarty and Shkilko (2008) only find abnormal short selling on days with insider sales and 
the event-day short selling is not able to identify the insider sales that have the largest future 
stock price decline, suggesting that the ability of short sellers to predict the negative news in 
insider trades is selective at best. These studies begin to question the informativeness of short 
sellers prior to negative news events. 
  Our motivation for the current study is driven by the conflicting findings around short 
sellers and their ability to capitalize on negative news announcements, combined with those of  
Halek and Eckles (2010) indicating insurer financial strength ratings provide informational value 
to the market, specifically that of unfavorable ratings. Insurer financial strength rating (IFSR) 
downgrades make tests of informed short selling relevant for two reasons.  First, IFSR 
announcements are not presented on a fixed calendar schedule, in turn IFSR are less predictable 
than other types of announcements such as earnings or analysts’ recommendations.  Secondly, 
IFSR are focused on insurance companies. Insurance companies vary in their level of opaqueness 
as their asset and liability structure is focused in different lines of insurance business that vary in 
the level of uncertainty (Ross, 1989; Baranoff and Sager, 2002; Zhang, Cox, and Van Ness, 
2009).  The opaqueness of the liabilities and assets of an insurer may affect the amount of 
information short sellers have to capitalize on, based on uncertainty of claims payouts. Thus, 
IFSR changes provide a robust framework for testing whether short sellers have a superior ability 
to process information.  If short sellers are better able to process the information contained in 
IFSR, we expect to see abnormally high short selling before IFSR downgrades, regardless of the 
degree of opaqueness in the insurers asset and liability structure. 
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Using a sample of 25 A.M. Best ratings downgrades announced between January 1, 2005 
and December 31, 2006, we examine shorting activity surrounding IFSR changes. We first 
examine short selling prior to IFSR downgrades to test if short sellers are able to predict IFSR 
downgrades, referred to as the sophisticated trading hypothesis.  Second, we examine the 
relation between abnormal short selling and the degree of opaqueness of downgraded insurers to 
determine whether short sellers are unusually sophisticated in their response to the downgrade, 
which we denote as the front running hypothesis.  Our results are interesting.  First, in support of 
sophisticated trading hypothesis, we find evidence of abnormal short selling prior to IFSR 
downgrades. Our tests are robust to the standardized short ratio and standardized short turnover 
measures of short selling. Observing abnormal levels of shorting activity during the pre-IFSR 
period indicates that short sellers’ are sophisticated in processing information related to the 
IFSR. Secondly, contrary to the front running hypothesis, we find opaqueness negatively affects 
the level of short selling activity. If short sellers are recipients of private information or are 
unusually sophisticated prior to IFSR downgrades, then the front running hypothesis predicts 
abnormally high short selling prior to IFSR downgrades regardless of the degree of opaqueness 
of the downgraded insurer.  
An observation of Halek and Eckles (2010) reveals that returns in the two days prior to 
downgrades become significantly negative suggesting that some sophisticated investors 
anticipate the price reaction to downgrades.  Our univariate tests reveal that, indeed, market-
adjusted returns begin to move in the direction of the ratings change beginning two days prior to 
the downgrade.  Interestingly, we further show that short sellers have an impressive ability to 
predict downgrades as short selling begins to increase a day before the ratings downgrade occurs.   
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In our multivariate tests we find that short selling is abnormally high on the day prior to 
downgrades, ceteris paribus.  In addition, we examine the documented positive relation between 
short selling and contemporaneous returns.  Consistent with Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009), we 
find that short sellers are generally contrarian in contemporaneous returns.  However, on the day 
prior to the downgrade, we find that short sellers become less contrarian as the relation between 
short selling and current returns weakens.  This latter result indicates that short sellers become 
less concerned about contemporaneous price movements and more concerned with the upcoming 
price reaction to the ratings downgrade.  Our analysis of short selling around ratings downgrades 
is consistent with the idea that information about the ratings change is available to short sellers 
before the change is publicly observed, although other explanations exist.  These findings are 
relevant to those in Halek and Eckles (2010) as we begin to see that not only do prices respond in 
the direction of the ratings change, but the price response occurs prior to the public observation 
of the downgrade and is anticipated by sophisticated short sellers. 
We further extend our analysis by examining the relation between abnormal short selling 
and the degree of opaqueness of downgraded insurers.  While insurers are similar to that of 
banks in opaqueness of their assets (Ross, 1989; Polonchek and Miller, 1999), the opaqueness of 
insurers’ liabilities is unique (Babbel and Merrill, 2005; Baranoff and Sager, 2002; Zhang et al. 
2009). Overall, the literature suggests that insurance companies present an increased degree of 
information asymmetry between claimholders, investors and the firm due to opaqueness of their 
liability and asset structure. Most recently, Zhang et al. (2009) found that the adverse selection 
component of the spread, which measures the level of asymmetric information between market 
makers and traders, is increasing in the level of firm opaqueness.   If short sellers are recipients 
of private information or are unusually sophisticated prior to IFSR downgrades, then the front 
43 
 
running hypothesis predicts abnormally high short selling prior to IFSR downgrades regardless 
of the degree of opaqueness of the downgraded insurer. Following the methods of Zhang et al. 
(2009) in defining opaqueness, we reject the front running hypothesis by finding the degree of 
opaqueness of an insurer’s liabilities and assets negatively affects the level of short selling in the 
insurer’s stock.     
As previously mentioned Christophe et al. (2010) contend that abnormal pre-downgrade 
shorting activity is consistent with informed investors acquiring information about an upcoming 
downgrade and establish short positions prior to the release date in order to take advantage of the 
price reaction to the recommendation change. However, Blau and Wade (2011) argue that 
observing abnormal short selling prior to downgrades is not equivalent to determining that short 
sellers can acquire information, as they show short-selling patterns surrounding both analyst 
downgrades and upgrades are remarkably symmetric. For robustness, we follow Blau and Wade 
(2011) and examine short selling around favorable IFSR changes.  We find abnormally low short 
selling on days prior to IFSR upgrades and that short selling spikes on days with IFSR upgrades.  
In our multivariate tests, we find the estimate for the upgrade dummy variable, capturing the 
upgrade event day, becomes negative suggesting that short sellers are not necessarily concerned 
about the upgrade as much as they are about the price reaction to the upgrade.  Combined with 
the findings in Halek and Eckles (2010), who document little or no price response to ratings 
upgrades, our results show that short sellers either attenuate the insignificant price reaction or 
short sellers recognize that upgrades do not provide valuable information to the market that has 
not already impacted prices. We are left to conclude that pre-IFSR downgrade short selling is 
motivated by some amount of tradable information rather than speculation. 
44 
 
The next section reviews related prior literature. The following section develops our 
hypotheses, and sample and data are introduced in the subsequent section. The next two sections 
present our empirical methodology and discuss our results. The final section concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2.2 
PRIOR LITERATURE 
Financial strength ratings have been thought of as summary measure of insolvency risk 
for a number of years (Pottier and Sommer, 1999). The rating provides a rating agency's opinion 
of the insurer's overall financial strength and ability to meet its policyholder obligations. This 
financial strength rating has been related to a myriad of characteristic, such as capitalization, 
liquidity and size (Pottier, 1998). Financial strength ratings are assigned to both individual 
companies and to consolidated groups of insurance firms. These ratings are important because 
they influence the price insurers can charge for their policies (Doherty and Phillips, 2002).  
Insurance company ratings, specifically those issued by A.M. Best, are vitally important 
to consumers, insurers, investors, regulators, and insurance brokers and agents. Insurance 
consumers use them in determining which insurance companies they purchase coverage and/or 
determining the cost they are willing to pay for insurance from their chosen company. The 
ratings are as valuable, if not more, to the insurers who use the ratings for advertising purposes in 
order to convey the company’s financial strength and ability to meet obligations to their policy 
holders. Often during the individual insurance purchasing process, brokers and agents 
recommend coverage based on the ratings provided for a specific company, whereas corporate 
insurance consumers require that all their insurers be highly rated. Investors identify ratings as an 
indication of investment risk (Sclafane, 2000) and regulators incorporate ratings in evaluating 
insurer financial strength (Schwartz, 1994). 
46 
 
While the ratings are utilized for different purposes, the ratings contain new information 
which may be of interest to individuals or companies incorporating the ratings into their decision 
making process. The informational content of ratings is apparent when looking at the reaction the 
capital markets have to a ratings change. Halek and Eckles (2010) hypothesize that a rating 
agency possesses superior information relative to the public and that its ratings announcements 
add to the public information related to an insurer. In testing their hypotheses, Halek and Eckles 
(2010) find that stock prices of insurance companies tend to move in the direction of ratings 
changes, particularly for unfavorable ratings changes, thus indicating that ratings provide 
informational value to the market. As further evidence of the information in ratings, Pottier and 
Sommer (1999) suggests that the ratings themselves may be predicted by publicly available 
information such as insurer size, profitability and growth in premiums written.  
In regards to the information contained in a ratings change, investors may be concerned 
with rating changes due to the potential changes insurers’ future cash flows. Doherty and Phillips 
(2002) suggest that during the period in which A.M. Best changed their ratings standards, 
insurers significantly increasing their working capital. Furthermore, Doherty and Phillips (2002) 
suggested that losing a high financial strength rating had a significant impact on an insurer, and 
that rating agencies play an important function in reducing the asymmetric information between 
the insurers and consumers. Cummins and Danzon (1997) observe that insurance premiums are 
positively related to financial strength ratings, while Pottier (1998) indicate that adverse rating 
changes had significant predicting power for forecasting life insurer insolvency. These previous 
findings combined with those of Halek and Eckles (2010) indicate that ratings provide 
information to investors on the financial strength of an insurer. 
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In theory, if trading activity is combined with private information, then the outcome of 
the trading activity may well make possible price discovery or reveal future price movements. As 
such, investors who have realization of private information can decide to be active and take 
advantage of on their private information. Evidence supporting the idea that short sellers are 
informed is robust.  Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predicts that unanticipated increases in 
short selling will be followed by negative returns. Further Diamond & Verrecchia (1987) 
conclude that short sellers possess superior information about future stock performance.  
Empirical tests of the Diamond & Verrecchia (1987) hypothesis confirm that short sellers are 
sophisticated and possess superior information about the true value of stocks. Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987) hypothesis is based on the thought that short sellers face borrowing 
constraints and when these constraints are severe, short selling becomes costly.  As such, short 
sellers who are willing to face these costs must be informed about future downward price 
movements to make short selling less risky.   
Empirical results consistently find that current short selling relates inversely with future 
returns indicating that short sellers are informed (Senchack and Starks, 1993; Aitken et al. 1998; 
Desai et al. 2002; Boehmer et al. 2008; Engelberg et al. 2010; Christophe et al. 2004; Christophe 
et al. 2010).  While short sellers appear to be informed about future downward price movements, 
the question as to whether short sellers are informed about upcoming negative news contained in 
firm-specific announcements is currently of interest in the literature; primarily based on a recent 
stream of literature suggest that short sellers are no more sophisticated prior to information 
events than other traders (Daske etal. 2005; Boehmer and Wu, 2008; Chakrabarty and Shkilko, 
2008; Blau and Wade, 2011; Blau and Pinegar, 2010). These studies bring into question the 
sophistication and informativeness of short sellers prior to negative news events. 
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The opaqueness of financial institutions, such as insurance companies, banks, and 
investment funds, has been the topic research examining information related factors and 
information asymmetries between financial institutions and investors.  Ross (1989) compares the 
opaqueness of banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds and suggests that banks and 
insurers contain more asymmetric information in their asset composition than mutual funds. 
Additionally, Ross (1989) interprets the results as insurance companies and banks are among the 
most opaque because managers have informational advantages about firm operations and 
specifically, the level of risk in the firm’s asset structure.  Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran, 
(2004) examined the relative opaqueness of various assets in bank portfolios and showed that 
asset opaqueness affected the adverse selection costs. Overall, the literature suggests that 
insurance companies and banks present the greatest degree of information asymmetry between 
claimholders and the financial institution in regards to the institutions assets (Polonchek and 
Miller, 1996). 
However there are differences in opaqueness between banks and insurance companies. 
While both banks and insurance companies have a relatively similar asset opaqueness structure, 
their liability structures differ significantly. Banks’ liabilities are normally well-classified in 
regards to the monetary sum and length of exposure. However, insurance companies are unique 
in this manner, since their liabilities are far less certain due to the predictability of the length of 
the claims payout and the final overall payout.  As such the insurers’ liabilities create a much 
larger degree of information asymmetry than that of a bank. Specifically, there exists uncertainty 
about the payout on claims between some lines of business, which increases the information 
asymmetry between claimholders, investors and the financial institution.   
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Specific to insurers, the liabilities are defined within the property-casualty (P/C) and life-
health (L/H) lines. Babbel and Merrill (2005) suggest the intricate nature and opaqueness of 
insurance policies allow managers for both P/C and L/H insurers to generate ambiguous financial 
measures of liabilities, surplus, and reserves. Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1998) separate P/C 
lines of business into long-tailed and short-tailed lines, depending on the length of the claim 
payouts. Their results show the price of insurance is inversely related to the riskiness of the firm, 
and that this is stronger for long-tail lines of business than for short-tail lines. Colquitt, Hoyt, and 
McCullough (2006) indicate P/C insurers increase the information asymmetry by utilizing 
greater discretion in setting loss reserves. 
In examining life/health insurers, Baranoff and Sager (2002) suggest that accident and 
health lines contain more asymmetric information than annuities because of the uncertainty of 
when claims will be paid out.  Baranoff and Sager (2002) also suggest that group lines of 
business contain more asymmetric information than individual lines.  Zhang et al. (2009) 
separate lines of business into opaque and transparent lines.  The authors then test the effects of 
opaqueness on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.  Their findings suggest 
that the opaqueness of a firm’s liabilities directly affects the adverse selection component of the 
spread.   
These multiple streams of literature; the information content in IFSR, the informativeness 
and sophistication of short sellers, and the understanding that insurance companies vary in their 
degree of information asymmetry, lead us to develop two hypotheses presented in the following 
section. 
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CHAPTER 2.3 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Ratings of publicly traded insurers come in a number of forms and provide investors an 
indication of a myriad of firm risk characteristics such as investment risk, credit risk, default risk, 
insolvency risk and financial strength. With the recent financial crisis and the concerns around 
insolvency of financial institutions, the importance for accurate and timely information regarding 
the insolvency risk of insurers is evident. With that, insurer financial strength ratings (IFSR), 
which are one form of ratings of public insurers, historically has provided information on 
insolvency risk to potential investors, as well as insight to consumers of insurance products. 
Halek and Eckles (2010) indicate that through the diligence of the ratings process and working 
relationship between rating analysts and insurance company management, rating analysts may 
have more information regarding an insurer than the investing public, providing rating 
announcements with potential informational value for capital markets. Our research extends 
Halek and Eckles (2010) and examines the response of informed traders to the potential 
contribution of the enhanced information content to the market provided by changes in IFSR. 
Should the information conveyed in IFSR changes provide information to the market, one 
would expect informed traders would be able to capitalize on this superior information. This 
would be particularly evident in ratings downgrades, which have been accepted in the literature 
as a negative news event. Some research indicates short sellers are active traders who capitalize 
on superior information about future stock performance and the true value of stocks (Diamond 
and Verrecchia, 1987). Further, empirical results indicate that short selling is inversely related to 
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subsequent returns and that this relationship is particularly evident in informational rich events 
with unfavorable announcements (Senchack and Starks, 1993; Aitken et al. 1998; Desai et al. 
2002; Boehmer et al. 2008; Engelberg et al. 2010; Christophe et al. 2004; Christophe et al. 
2010).  However, others question the informativeness of short sellers prior to negative news 
events and suggest short sellers are no more sophisticated prior to information events than other 
traders (Daske et al. 2005; Boehmer and Wu, 2008; Blau and Wade, 2011; Blau and Pinegar, 
2010).   
Motivated by these conflicting viewpoints, our study examines short selling around IFSR 
changes.  Insurer financial strength rating (IFSR) downgrades make tests of informed short 
selling relevant for two reasons.  First, IFSR announcements are not scheduled; as such the 
announcement is less predictable than other types of announcements.  Secondly, IFSR are 
focused on insurance companies who vary in their level of opaqueness (Ross, 1989; Baranoff 
and Sager, 2002; Zhang et al. 2009).  The opaqueness of the liability and asset structure of an 
insurer may challenge short sellers’ information processing ability based on uncertainty of claims 
payouts. Thus, IFSR changes provide a robust framework for testing whether short sellers have a 
superior ability to process information or are privately informed.  If short sellers are either 
privately informed or better able to process the information contained in IFSR, we expect to see 
abnormally high short selling before IFSR downgrades, regardless of the degree of opaqueness in 
the insurers asset and liability structure. Together we propose two hypotheses: sophisticated 
trading hypothesis and the front running hypothesis. 
The sophistication of short sellers is empirically supported by numerous studies that find 
short selling is inversely related to subsequent returns (Senchack and Starks, 1993; Aitken et al. 
1998; Desai et al. 2002; Boehmer et al. 2008; Engelberg et al. 2010; Christophe et al. 2004; 
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Christophe et al. 2010). Most recently, Christophe et al. (2004) and Christophe et al. (2010) 
examine shorting activity prior to earnings announcements and analyst recommendations, 
respectively, and find that short selling is abnormally high prior to both unfavorable earnings 
announcements and downward analyst recommendation changes. Based on these finding that 
short sellers have a remarkable ability to capitalize on negative news events, we hypothesis the 
following: 
 
Hypothesis 1- There will be abnormal short selling in the insurer stock prior to the IFSR 
downgrade (sophisticated trading hypothesis). 
 
The alternative to Hypothesis 1 is that the IFSR downgrade announcement will have a positive 
(or no) effect on short selling. Observing normal levels of shorting activity during the IFSR pre-
announcement period indicates that either (i) short sellers are caught off guard by the IFSR 
announcement or (ii) short sellers are unable to obtain private information during the IFSR pre-
announcement period. 
Following Hypothesis 1, we examine the effect opaqueness in insurer’s lines of business 
or assets have on short selling around ratings downgrades. It has been argued that the insurance 
industry is more opaque that other industries (Morgan, 2002). Insurance firms vary in their level 
of opaqueness as their liability structure is focused in different lines of insurance business that 
vary in the level of uncertainty (Zhang et al., 2009). In a general sense opaqueness may have an 
adverse affect on information processing due to the difficulty of obtaining information for more 
opaque stocks. However should short sellers be sophisticated or privately informed, the level of 
opaqueness should not have a negative impact on the short selling activity. As such, taking these 
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findings coupled with the findings suggesting short sellers are privately informed or 
sophisticated in their ability to process information, we hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2 – The opaqueness of a firm’s liabilities will positively affect the level of short 
selling in the insurer stock prior to the IFSR downgrade (front running hypothesis). 
 
The alternative to Hypothesis 2 is that opaqueness will have a negative effect on short selling.  It 
has been argued that should short sellers are not privately informed nor overly sophisticated in 
their processing of information prior to information compared to other traders (Daske et al. 2005; 
Boehmer and Wu, 2008; Chakrabarty and Shkilko, 2008; Blau and Wade, 2011; Blau and 
Pinegar, 2010). 
We expect evaluating these hypotheses will yield a better understating of how the 
information conveyed in IFSR downgrades is incorporated by short sellers and if opaqueness in 
the firms lines of business or assets impacts short selling around IFSR downgrades. 
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CHAPTER 2.4 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
A.M. Best’s Key Rating Guides and A.M. Best’s Insurance Reports provide insurer 
ratings data for our sample period January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2006. In defining our ratings 
sample, we follow the methodology of Halek and Eckles (2010). Insurers in our sample must be 
rated twice during the 2005-2006 sample period. Based on the nature of the insurance industry, 
frequently multiple individual insurance companies may be held by a single publicly traded 
company. In these instances, the group rating for an insurer is utilized; while sole companies that 
are not a member (or a singular member) of a group, the rating for that single company is used. 
Furthermore, if there is not a group rating for a publicly traded insurer, but companies within the 
group have similar ratings, this similar rating is used.  
The sample consists of 25 publicly traded insurers (14-PC, 11-LH) with a total of 25 
A.M. Best ratings downgrades. While we would prefer to analyze more events, we are restricted 
in the extending our time period because Regulation SHO data was not available before 2005 
and after the first of 2007.  It should be noted, over our 2 year time period the distribution of 
ratings events is consistent with previous annual ratings events over a 10 year period (Halek and 
Eckles, 2010). In addition, we focus or analysis on A.M. Best  ratings, as previous work has 
suggested event study results vary by the rating agency making the announcement, where A.M. 
Best  provide stronger results when reporting  cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcements when compared to those of S&P or Moody’s (Halek and Eckles, 2010; Halek 
and Eckles, 2011). 
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Several restrictions are placed on our data in arriving at our final sample. Ratings are 
eliminated if they occur within 5-days of an S&P, Moody’s or Weiss ratings change. Halek and 
Eckles (2011) present the reinforcement hypothesis, suggesting the market reaction is likely to be 
more severe when capturing the effect of a rating issued in possible response to another rating. 
Further ratings were eliminated if the insurer rating downgrade was due to other announcements 
or events directly related to the insurer that occurred around the time of the downgrade (Halek 
and Eckles, 2011). For example, our sample is during the hurricane seasons of 2005 and 2006. If 
a rating agency downgraded an insurer because of “weather related influences” on the same or 
previous day, any associated decline in stock returns may be a result of the response to the 
hurricane landfall rather the downgrade itself. As such we eliminate ratings within 5-days of 
identified “related” events.  
 
We obtain short sale data in response to the Regulation SHO.  From the Center of 
Research on Security Prices (CRSP), we obtain daily volume, prices, returns, shares outstanding, 
and market capitalization.  After aggregating the short sale data to the daily level, we calculate a 
measure that is frequently used in the literature (Boehmer and Wu, 2008; Diether et al. 2009; 
Blau and Wade, 2011).  Following Diether et al. (2009), we restrict our sample to stocks that 
trade every day of the time period (January 2005 to December 2006); have price greater than $2; 
and have a CRSP share code of 10 or 11). We obtain the lines of business, liability and asset data 
from the NAIC database and follow Zhang et al. (2009) and Baranoff and Sager (2003) in 
defining opaque and non-opaque liabilities and assets in P/C, and L/H lines of business, 
respectively.  
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Testing the sophisticated trading and front running hypotheses, we examine short selling 
prior to IFSR downgrades, as well as the relation between abnormal short selling and the degree 
of opaqueness of downgraded insurers. In testing these hypotheses we follow previous literature 
in defining the dependent and independent control variables. The following section documents 
the variables. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Short Ratio: Deither et al (2009) defined the short ratio, as the daily number of shares sold short 
for a stock day divided by the total number of shares traded in the stock during the same day, to 
normalize across stocks. The authors suggested the short ratio measure is much less skewed than 
the other measures of short-selling activity. Further Christophe et al. (2010) suggested that 
distributional differences in short selling activity around announcement events may be due to 
unusually high or low trading volume prior to the announcement, and by measuring short selling 
as a percentage of trading volume would  result in a relatively constant measure. We calculate 
the short ratio (SR) as the daily number of shares sold short for a stock day divided by the total 
number of shares traded in the stock during the same day. 
 
Short Turnover: There are variations in the literature as to which measure of short selling is used 
in empirical testing. For instance, recent event studies by Chakrabarty and Shkilko (2010), 
Christophe et al. (2010), and Massoud et al. (2010) break from the short ratio methodology used 
in some of the prior studies (Diether et al., 2009), and use an alternative methods to scale short 
volume (short turnover). Chakrabarty and Shkilko (2010) use the natural log adjustment of short 
volume simultaneously controlling for non-short volume in their regression models. Christophe 
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et al. (2010) scale short volume by the number of shares outstanding, whereas Massoud et al. 
(2010) scale short volume by its historical average. Consistent with these studies we calculate the 
daily short turnover (STO) as the daily short volume scaled by the number of shares outstanding; 
 
Independent Variables 
Size: Diether et al. (2009) and Boehmer et al. (2007) report that market capitalization 
influences the short selling of stocks.  The authors suggest smaller stocks may have less of a 
following by analysts and therefore, may experience more trading by informed investors than 
larger stocks.  Additionally, Arnold et al. (2005) use market capitalization as a proxy for 
institutional holdings, suggesting that institutions are likely to hold larger cap stocks. 
Therefore, a security’s market capitalization will affect the level of short selling.  However, if 
asymmetric information exists more in small-cap stocks, then short selling may be negatively 
related to size.  Consistent with this argument, Diether et al. (2009) find that short sellers are 
more informed in smaller stocks.  They also document a positive relation between trading 
activity and the level of short selling.      
 
Past Returns: Diether et al. (2009) show that daily short volume is positively related to lagged 
returns. Our variable reti,t-3t-1, represents the movement of the stock price during the three days 
prior to the A.M. Best ratings change announcement. This variable controls for the possibility 
that upward or downward changes in the stock price might affect the level of short-selling in the 
days leading up to the announcement. A pre-announcement increase in stock price, for example, 
might affect short-selling by inducing some investors to short the now “over-valued” stock. With 
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this control variable in place, the model does not wrongly attribute all pre-announcement short-
selling to expectations regarding the earnings release. 
 
Price Volatility: Following Diether et al. (2009), price volatility is calculated by taking the 
difference between the daily high price and the daily low price (both from CRSP) and dividing 
the difference by the daily high price.  Diether et al. (2009) document that price volatility 
positively affects the level of short selling.  If short sellers are informed, as the literature 
suggests, then the level of short selling will be a function of the flow of information into the 
market.  Clark (1973) and Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) establish a theoretical relation 
between price volatility and information flow.   
 
Return Volatility: Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006), studied the impact of trades on daily 
volatility. They find that increased activity by contrarian traders (identified as sales following 
price increases) is associated with lower future volatility, while increased activity by herding 
investors (identified as buyers after price increases) is associated with higher future volatility. 
Avramov et al. (2006) argue that contrarian traders are rational traders who trade to benefit from 
the deviation of prices from fundamentals. As these trades make prices more informative, they 
tend to reduce future return volatility. 
 
Lagged Short Selling: Short selling and trading volume are both positively autocorrelated (Blau et al, 
2008; Blau 2010). To account for this, we include lagged short sales (SSR,t-8,t-4; SSTO,t-8,t-4) and  turnover 
(vtoi,t-3,t-) on the right-hand side. If returns are positively autocorrelated, we risk falsely associating past 
returns with today’s short-selling activity. Therefore, we also include the contemporaneous return (reti,t-3t-
1) as an explanatory variable. 
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Down: The variable of interest is the indicator variable Down, which equals one if day t is the 
day of a ratings downgrade; zero otherwise.  If short sellers can anticipate unfavorable ratings 
changes, then we expect the estimate for Down to be significantly positive.  
 
Up: The variable of interest in our robustness test is the indicator variable Up, which equals one 
if day t is the day of a ratings upgrade; zero otherwise.   
 
Opaqueness: We follow Zhang et al. (2009) and Baranoff and Sager (2003) in defining opaque 
and non-opaque lines of business and assets in P/C, and L/H lines of business, respectively. 
PCopaque is the ratio of premiums written in opaque PC lines of business relative to total 
premiums written in PC lines.  LHopaque is the percentage of premiums written in opaque LH 
lines of business relative to premiums written in LH lines.  We combine these measures and 
arrive at a measure Lopaque defined as the percentage of premiums written in all opaque lines of 
business relative to total premiums.   We follow Flannery et al. (2004) and Zhang et al. (2009) 
methodologies to define the asset opaqueness measure Aopaque. By the Aopaque definition the 
most opaque assets held by an insurer are: mortgage loans, real estate investment, private 
placement loans and bonds, premium notes, premiums receivable, other investments, reinsurance 
recoverable on loss and loss adjustment expense payments and reinsurance ceded. 
Table 1 presents statistics that describe our sample. Panel A of Table 1 reports the 
downgraded firm characteristics during the entire sample time period, while Panel B. reports the 
downgraded firm characteristics on downgrade day. Panel A shows that the average stock in our 
sample has a price of $37.41, a market capitalization of $12.2 billion, a return volatility of 1.5 
60 
 
percent, and price volatility of 2.2 percent.  Turnover, which is the daily trade volume divided by 
the number of shares outstanding is the .49 percent.  The mean short ratio is 18.04 percent, which 
suggests that, on average, approximately 18 percent of daily trade volume is made up from short 
sales.  This figure is consistent with findings in Diether et al., (2009) and Blau et al., (2008). 
Panel B shows that firms in the sample on the downgrade date has a price of $41.27 with a 
negative return of -0.0128. It should be noted that on the downgrade day the short ratio increased 
to 27% of trading volume. 
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CHAPTER 2.5 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
We test the impact of ratings downgrades using both univariate and multivariate tests.  
We also test the relation of short selling and the degree of opaqueness in insurers’ liabilities and 
assets around ratings downgrades.  We conduct a standard event study using an 8-day window 
around rating downgrades.  We report market adjusted returns, which are calculated using the 
daily (CRSP) raw returns less the equally-weighted CRSP index return. We compute the average 
market adjusted returns for each and run a (cross-sectional) pair-wise t-test of changes in the 
mean. 
Our univariate short selling event study methodology follows several studies that 
examine trading activity around particular events (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986; Koski and 
Scruggs, 1998; and Sias, 2004) using the following equation: 
                             
                          
              
 (1) 
 
Specifically, we divide the difference between (i) the trading activity measure on day t 
for each stock i and (ii) the sample period mean of this measure for this stock by (iii) the sample 
period standard deviation for the stock. The procedure allows for a standardized measure that is 
similarly distributed across stocks, with a zero mean and a unit variance. This standardization 
makes shorting activity comparable across stocks with different trading volume. If more shorting 
systematically contributes to greater price efficiency, stock prices should deviate less from a 
random walk (Boehmer et al. 2008). Similar to the market adjusted returns analysis, we compute 
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the average standardized short ratio and standardized short turnover for each and run a (cross-
sectional) pair-wise t-test of changes in the mean. 
 
Our multivariate analysis is performed with panel data models examining both stock and 
day effects. We used a Hausman specification test to compare the fixed versus random effects 
under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in 
the model (Hausman 1978). H0 was rejected; as such a random effect model would produce 
biased estimators. As a result we estimate equation (2 and 3) while controlling for both stock and 
day fixed effects. Qualitatively similar results are obtained when we estimate standard errors that 
cluster by both stock and day (Thompson, 2006). Recognizing the need to control for other 
factors that influence the level of short-selling activity, we therefore estimate the following 
equations using the panel data fixed effect model: 
 
SSRi, t-3,t-1 = β0 +  β1sizei,t +  β2reti,t-3t-1 + β3vtoi,t-3,t-1 + β4p_volti,t-3,t-1 + β5r_volti,t-3,t-1 +  
β6SSR,t-8,t-4 + β7Downt + εi,t-3,t-1 (2) 
 
SSTOi, t-3,t-1 = β0 +  β1sizei,t +  β2reti,t-3t-1 + β3vtoi,t-3,t-1 + β4p_volti,t-3,t-1 + β5r_volti,t-3,t-1 +  
β6SSTOi,t-8,t-4 + β7Downt + εi,t-3,t-1 (3) 
 
The dependent variable is the short selling measure (SSR-standardized short ratio or 
SSTO-standardized short turnover) from days t-3 to t-1.  Following Diether et al. (2009) we 
include turnover (turni,t-3,t-1), price volatility (p_volti,t-3,t-1), return volatility (r_volti,t-3,t-1), and 
contemporaneous market-adjusted returns (reti,t-3,t-1).  As mentioned previously, Diether et al. 
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(2009) find that short selling is contrarian; to control for the contrarian behavior of short sellers, 
we include the cumulative contemporaneous return (reti,t-3,t-1).  A lagged dependent variable 
(SSR,t-8,t-4 and SSTO,t-8,t-4 and ) is also included to control for serial correlation in short-sale 
volume.  The variables of interest include the indicator variable Down, which equals one if day t 
is the day of a ratings downgrade; zero otherwise.  If short sellers can anticipate unfavorable 
ratings changes, then we expect the estimate for Down to be significantly positive.   
It has been argued that the insurance industry is more opaque that other industries 
(Morgan, 2002). In addition, insurance firms vary in their level of opaqueness as their liability 
and asset structure, while focusing in different lines of insurance business that vary in the level 
of uncertainty (Zhang et al., 2009). In testing the front running hypothesis, we further extend our 
regression analysis by examining the relation between abnormal short selling and the degree of 
opaqueness of downgraded insurers, as follows:   
 
SSRi, t-3,t-1 = β0 +  β1sizei,t +  β2reti,t-3t-1 + β3vtoi,t-3,t-1 + β4p_volti,t-3,t-1 + β5r_volti,t-3,t-1 +  
β6Sh_sell,t-8,t-4 + β7Downt +  β8Lopaquet + β9Aopaque + β10Downt x Lopaquet 
+β11Downt x Aopaquet + εi,t-3,t-1  (4) 
 
SSTOi, t-3,t-1 = β0 +  β1sizei,t +  β2reti,t-3t-1 + β3vtoi,t-3,t-1 + β4p_volti,t-3,t-1 + β5r_volti,t-3,t-1 
+  β6Sh_sell,t-8,t-4 + β7Downt +  β8Lopaquet + β9Aopaque + β10Downt x Lopaquet 
+β11Downt x Aopaquet + εi,t-3,t-1  (5) 
 
Similar to equations 2 and 3 we estimate equations 4 and 5 while controlling for both 
stock and day fixed effects. Qualitatively similar results are obtained when we estimate standard 
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errors that cluster by both stock and day (Thompson, 2006). The variables specifications are the 
same as in equation 2 and 3, while we include the opaqueness measures for both liabilities 
(Lopaque) and assets (Aopaque) following Zhang et al. (2009) and Baranoff and Sager (2003). 
Again, the variables of interest include the indicator variable Down, which equals one if day t is 
the day of a ratings downgrade; zero otherwise.  We also interact the opaqueness variables and 
the dummy variable (Lopaque t×Downt ; Aopaque t×Downt) to determine the relation of the 
degree of opaqueness of the firm’s liabilities or assets to short selling around IFSR downgrades. 
For robustness in addressing the findings of Christophe et al. (2010) and Blau and Wade 
(2011), we follow Blau and Wade (2011) and examine short selling around favorable IFSR 
changes. The univariate analysis and variable specifications are identical to that of the IFSR 
downgrade analysis, with the exception of the indicator variable Up, which equals one if day t is 
the day of a ratings upgrade; zero otherwise.  Our multivariate panel regression analysis for 
upgrades follows that of the downgrade analysis by estimating the following equations: 
 
SSRi t = β0 + β1sizei,t +  β2reti,t +β3vtoi,t-3,t-1 + β4p_volti,t-3,t-1 +  β5UPt + εi,t-5,t-1 (6) 
 
SSTOi t = β0 + β1sizei,t +  β2reti,t +β3vtoi,t-3,t-1 + β4p_volti,t-3,t-1 +  β5UPt + εi,t-5,t-1 (7) 
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CHAPTER 2.6 
RESULTS 
We begin our analysis by examining downgrades using both univariate and multivariate 
tests.  We also test the relation the opaqueness in insurer’s lines of business or assets to short 
selling around IFSR downgrades.   
 
Short Selling around Downgrades 
Our motivation for the current study is the conflicting findings around short sellers and their 
ability to capitalize on negative news announcements, combined with those of  Halek and Eckles 
(2010) indicating insurer financial strength ratings provide informational value to the market, 
specifically that of unfavorable ratings.  
Table 2 presents the distribution of ratings over the sample period. Table 3 contains the 
results of a standard event study using an 8-day window around rating downgrades.  Column (1) 
shows market-adjusted returns, which are calculated using the daily (CRSP) raw returns less the 
equally-weighted CRSP index return.  Consistent with Halek and Eckles (2010), we find that 
returns begin to adjust in the two days prior to the ratings downgrade.  As expected, daily returns 
are significantly negative on the event day and continue to remain negative for three days after 
the downgrade.  These results suggest that (i) observed downgrades negatively affect the 
company’s stock price and (ii) the stock price begins to adjust before the ratings change is 
publicly observed.  The implication that the stock price begins to adjust before the ratings change 
is publicly observed, suggests that some investors either predict the downgrade or somehow 
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acquire private information that the ratings will be revised downward.  In columns (2) through 
(5), we examine the short selling surrounding downgrades.  In column (2 and 4), we report the 
short ratio and short turnover.   
The results in columns (2) through (5) show that short selling begin to increase a day 
prior to downgrades for both short selling standardized measures.  These initial univariate results 
affirmatively answer the question that short sellers can anticipate unfavorable ratings changes, 
lending initial support in favor of the sophisticated trading hypothesis.  A possible explanation 
for these findings is that short sellers are sophisticated in processing information about the 
upcoming ratings change prior to the public disclosure.  Irvine et al. (2007) argue that abnormal 
institutional trading activity prior to initial analyst recommendations is consistent with the 
tipping hypothesis.  The tipping hypothesis suggests that analysts are inclined to tip preferred or 
potential clients because it allows for short-term trading profits.  While we do not go as far to say 
that ratings agencies are the source of information leakages, we do note that observing abnormal 
short selling prior to ratings downgrades are consistent with private information.   
The aforementioned argument against the interpretation of our findings suggests that 
short sellers are trading on the same information that ratings agencies use to conduct their 
analysis and make their ratings of financial strength.  On day t-1, both standardized short selling 
measures are larger than on any other day in the pre-downgrade period.  Ratings agencies have 
likely conducted the analysis before day t-1, so observing the highest amount of short selling the 
day before the ratings downgrade during the pre-downgrade period provides us with further 
confidence that short sellers have acquired private information about the upcoming ratings 
change before the information has become publicly available.  Table 3 also shows that the short 
selling spikes on day t and is abnormally high on the day after the downgrade.  These results 
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suggest that short sellers attenuate the downward price response documented in Halek and 
Eckles (2010).   
Table 4 columns [1] and [2] report the regression results using standardized short ratio 
and standardized short turnover, as the dependent variable, respectively.  We find turnover, price 
volatility, and lagged shorting activity are positively related to short selling.  Similar to Diether 
et al. (2009), we also find short sellers are contrarian in contemporaneous returns as the estimate 
for β1 is significantly positive.  Further, we still observe standardized short selling during the 
eight days prior to ratings downgrade to be positive.   
The results in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that short sellers are able to successfully anticipate 
ratings downgrades as we find abnormal short selling of insurance stocks on the day prior to a 
ratings downgrade.  Further, the results in Tables 3 and 4 lead us to accept the sophisticated 
trading hypothesis. A possible explanation is that information about the upcoming ratings 
downgrade leaks to market participants prior to downgrades.  Because information leaks are not 
observed, our explanation is left open to criticism. While, short selling prior to unfavorable 
ratings changes is, at a minimum, consistent with what we would expect to see if information 
was leaking into the market; we are left to interpret our results as short sellers are sophisticated 
traders specifically around IFSR rating.   
As mentioned earlier, we focus our attention on the effect of the opaque variables. Table 
5 presents the descriptive statistics for the opaqueness measures calculated following Zhang et al. 
(2009) and Baranoff and Sager (2003). Table 6 presents the results for equations 4 and 5. We 
find that the coefficient estimates for Lopaque, and Aopaque, are significantly negative in both 
dependent variable specifications.  We interpret these results to indicate that firm opaqueness in 
liabilities and assets negatively affects the level of short selling activity. However, this result 
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does not lead us to reject the front running hypothesis as it stands.  We turn our attention to the 
indicator variable Down, which equals one if day t is the day of a ratings downgrade; zero 
otherwise.  We report a significant positive coefficient for the Down dummy when controlling 
for the opaque variables for each dependent variable specification.  We interpret these results as 
evidence that short sellers can anticipate unfavorable ratings changes, which is consistent with 
the sophisticated trading hypothesis. The findings of interest are the interaction effects which 
directly tests the front running hypothesis. We interact the opaqueness variables and the dummy 
variable (Lopaque t×Downt ; Aopaque t×Downt) to determine the relation of the degree of 
opaqueness of the firm’s liabilities or assets to short selling around an IFSR downgrade. The 
results indicate negative and significant findings for insurers around downgrades. We interpret 
these results as short sellers are not any better at predicting future negative returns around IFRS 
downgrades of insurers with a higher degree of opaqueness, but rather the short selling around 
IFRS downgrades is primarily focused in lower opaque insurance firms. This interaction effect 
leads us to reject the front running hypothesis and suggest that while short sellers are indeed 
sophisticated traders they are not necessarily privately informed around IFSR downgrades 
 
Robustness: Short Selling around Upgrades 
In this subsection, we examine short selling around upgrades as a measure of robustness in 
testing whether short sellers can successfully anticipate ratings changes.  We show abnormal 
short selling prior to ratings downgrades. Here, we expect that short selling will be abnormally 
low prior ratings upgrades.   
 
69 
 
Table 7 contains the results of an event study around upgrades that mirrors the methods 
used around downgrades (Table 3).  Again, we focus our study on market-adjusted returns and 
short selling surrounding upgrades.  In column (1), we see that market-adjusted returns positively 
react to upgrades as returns are positive and significant on day t.   Compared to the results in 
Table 3, the return reaction for upgrades (0.0102) is less than half in magnitude than the return 
reaction for downgrades (-0.0128).  This finding is consistent with the conclusion in (Halek and 
Eckles, 2010), who argue that prices respond more to downgrades than to upgrades.  Further, we 
find the prices begin to react the day before the upgrade as market-adjusted returns are 0.0035 on 
day t-1.  We now turn our focus to our short selling measures.  The standardized short ratio is 
obtained using equation (1).  As expected, we find abnormally low short selling in the eight days 
prior to upgrades.  However, we observe a striking result on day t as short selling significantly 
spikes and remains positive on day t+1.  We interpret this latter result as consistency with the 
notion that short sellers add to the informational efficiency in prices (Boehmer and Wu, 2008).   
Diether et al. (2009) submit that short sellers target stocks that become overvalued.  This new 
finding of abnormal short selling on days with positive news suggests that short sellers are 
attenuating the price efficiency of stocks by monitoring the price reaction to the news of an 
upgrade.  
In columns (1 and 2) of Table 8, we find that after controlling for some of the factors that 
influence the level of short selling, we observe abnormal short selling on days with upgrades. 
Interestingly, in columns (1) and (2), the estimate for the dummy variable UP is significantly 
negative.  A possible explanation is that short sellers are not concerned with the announcement 
as much as they are concerned with the price reaction to the announcements.  This interpretation 
is consistent with Diether et al. (2009), who argue that short sellers target stocks that become out 
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of line with their fundamental value.  The findings in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that short sellers, 
who are known to add to the informational efficiency of prices (Boehmer and Wu, 2008), believe 
that stocks become overvalued in response to ratings upgrades. 
Tests of whether stocks become mispriced in response to upgrades are outside the scope 
of this paper.  However, Halek and Eckles (2010) conclude that prices have little or no response 
to good news in ratings in the form of upgrades suggesting that upgrades do not contain a lot of 
informational value to the market.  Our findings, at a minimum, suggest that some short sellers 
believe that little or no information is contained in upgrades.  Relative to the results in Halek and 
Eckles (2010), our study suggests that part of the reason prices do not substantially respond to 
upgrades is because some pessimistic investors do not feel ratings upgrades provide any 
informational value.  Continued analysis of this conjecture is left to further research. The 
findings in Table 7 and 8 indicate that (i) abnormally low short selling occurs before upgrades 
supporting earlier findings that imply short sellers anticipate ratings changes and (ii) short selling 
surges on days with favorable ratings changes suggesting that short sellers do not believe that 
upgrades contain informational value about future returns.    
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CHAPTER 2.7 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study indicate that short sellers successfully anticipate ratings changes 
as short selling is abnormally high (low) prior to ratings downgrades (upgrades).  These findings 
help explain the results in Halek and Eckles (2010), who show that prices adjust to unfavorable 
ratings changes while positive ratings changes have little or no effect on price movements.  
Combined with Halek and Eckles (2010) results, we show that short selling attenuates the 
downside price pressure in response to downgrades.  Further, our study suggests that a partial 
reason that prices do not substantially react to upgrades is because some short sellers do not 
believe that upgrades contain informational value to market participants.   
While others show that short selling can predict negative returns at the daily level, we 
show that the negative relation between current short selling and future returns is stronger on the 
day before downgrades.  Further, after controlling for other factors that influence future returns, 
we show that short selling on days with favorable ratings changes can predict negative returns 
better than usual. We recognize that information leakages are not observed and so the 
interpretation of our tests is left to some criticism.  However, abnormal short selling prior to 
downgrades is at a minimum, consistent with the notion that information about upcoming ratings 
changes is absorbed to short sellers prior to the public dissemination of the ratings changes. 
The results of this analysis provide initial evidence supporting the idea that information 
about upcoming ratings changes is available to short sellers, particularly for negative news 
events such as ratings downgrades.  For positive news events, we document new evidence 
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supporting the notion that short sellers target stocks they believe have become overvalued.  
While we do not test whether insurance stocks are mispriced after upgrades, we provide an 
indication that some investors believe that indeed they are.  While we find abnormal short selling 
prior to ratings downgrades, we also find that an insurers’ asset and liability opaqueness 
negatively affects the level of short selling activity prior to a financial strength ratings 
downgrade. We are left to conclude that while short sellers are superior in their information 
processing ability, they do not appear to be privately informed around insurer financial strength 
ratings changes. A fruitful area of future research may be to determine the price efficiency of 
insurance stocks around insurer financial strength ratings.   
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
The table shows summary statistics of the sample used in the analysis.  Panel A reports the price, market adjusted 
returns, market capitalization, the return volatility, the price volatility, the share turnover, the short turnover, and the 
short ratio for the average stock used in our sample.  Size is the CRSP market capitalization.  R_volt is the return 
volatility calculated as the standard deviation of the daily returns from day t-10 to day t, where day t is the current 
trading day.  P_volt is the price volatility obtained by taking the difference between the daily high price and the 
daily low price divided by the daily high price.   Turnover is the trade volume divided by the shares outstanding 
while the short turnover (sto) is the short volume divided by the shares outstanding.  Short ratio is the short volume 
divided by the total volume. 
Panel A. Downgraded firm characteristics during the entire sample time period.   
  N Mean Median Min Max 
Price 25 37.4100 32.3559 2.2415 107.8710 
Return 25 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0019 
Size 25 12,260,546 1,057,706 57,010 164,459,426 
Rvolt 25 0.0154 0.0152 0.0040 0.0252 
Pvolt 25 0.0228 0.0226 0.0089 0.0355 
Vto 25 0.0049 0.0042 0.0003 0.0126 
Sto 25 0.0019 0.0018 0.0001 0.0033 
Short Ratio 25 0.1804 0.1856 0.0380 0.2678 
      
Panel B. Downgraded firm characteristics on downgrade day.   
  N Mean Median Min Max 
Price 25 41.2719 38.6650 2.4000 129.6600 
Return 25 -0.0128 -0.0099 -0.0733 0.0326 
Size 25 12,585,986 1,240,915 50,066 145,815,268 
Rvolt 25 0.0166 0.0160 0.0059 0.0341 
Pvolt 25 0.1571 0.1328 0.0702 0.7363 
Vto 25 0.0057 0.0039 0.0001 0.0356 
Sto 25 0.0092 0.0087 0.0020 0.0163 
Short Ratio 25 0.2752 0.2450 0.0001 0.5340 
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Table 2. A.M. Best ratings downgrades between 2005-2006.  
All Downgrades during the sample time period.   
  2005 2006 
  PC-Group LH-Group PC-Group LH-Group 
Jan       1 
Feb         
Mar     2   
Apr 3     1 
May 1 1 3   
Jun     1   
Jul       1 
Aug     1   
Sep 1   1   
Oct 1 1 1   
Nov 4     2 
Dec 1 3 3 1 
Year Total 11 5 12 6 
Sample Total   34     
Current sample of Downgrades used in analysis 
  2005   2006   
2005 PC-Group LH-Group PC-Group LH-Group 
Jan       1 
Feb         
Mar     1   
Apr 1     1 
May 1 1 2   
Jun     1   
Jul       1 
Aug     1   
Sep 1   1   
Oct 1 1 1   
Nov 4     1 
Dec 1 1 1 1 
Year Total 9 3 8 5 
Sample Total   25     
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Table 3 
Short Selling around A.M. Best Rating Downgrades 
The table shows a standard event study of market-adjusted returns and short selling around A.M. Best rating 
downgrades.  We obtain downgrades from A.M. Best data and report the market-adjusted returns (the difference 
between the daily return and the CRSP equally-weighted return for a particular stock), the short ratio, and the short 
turnover surrounding rating downgrades.  Tests for significant returns are determined by standard t-statistics testing 
for differences from zero.  We test for the significance in short selling using two different methods.  We also 
standardize short selling activity by calculating the difference between the short activity for stock i on day t and the 
mean short activity for stock i (across the sample time period).  We then divide the difference by the standard 
deviation of daily short activity so that each short measure on each day is similarly distributed with a zero mea n and 
a unit variance.   T-statistics testing whether the standardized measure is significantly different than zero (the mean) 
are obtain.  Results from t-tests, which test whether the standardized and abnormal measures are significantly 
different than zero (the mean) are shown using asterisks. 
 
  Adjusted Returns Short Ratio Std_Short Ratio Short Turnover 
Std_SShort 
Turnover 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
t-8,t-4 0.0093* 0.2031 0.3977** 0.0008 0.2212 
t-3 -0.0036 0.2332 0.3291 0.0006 0.0793 
t-2 -0.0109** 0.2106 0.3944 0.0006 0.0963 
t-1 -0.0121** 0.2412 0.5122** 0.0054 0.2915** 
event day -0.0128** 0.2752 0.6612** 0.0092 0.5009** 
t+1 -0.0039* 0.2062 0.2433 0.0063 0.3764** 
t+2 -0.0071** 0.2069 0.1293 0.001 0.1534 
t+3 -0.005 0.1999 0.1857 0.0042 0.1692 
t+4,t+8 0.0009 0.1855 0.3012 0.0017 0.0154 
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SSTOi, t-3,t-1 = β0 +  β1sizei,t +  β2reti,t-3t-1 + β3vtoi,t-3,t-1 + β4p_volti,t-3,t-1 + β5r_volti,t-3,t-1 +  β6SSTOi,t-8,t-4 + 
β7Downt + εi,t-3,t-1 (3) 
 
The independent variables include contemporaneous share turnover (turni,t-3,t-1), return volatility (r_volti,t-3,t-1), and 
price volatility (p_volti,t-3,t-1). We also include a lagged dependent variable to control for serial correlation (Sh_sell,t-
8,t-4) and the contemporaneous market-adjusted return (reti,t-3,t-1).  The variable of interest is Downt, which is an 
indicator variable equal to one on the IFSR downgrade announcement day.  A Hausman test reveals fixed effects by 
stock and days.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  
    Ssri, t-3 t-1   Sstoi, t-3 t-1 
    [1]   [2] 
intercept  4.2999***  2.8104*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Sizei  -0.2425***  -0.1948*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
reti, t-3, t-1  14.6315***  11.4321*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
vtoi, t-3, t-1  3.7417**  102.2437*** 
  (0.015)  (0.000) 
pvolti, t-3, t-1  4.7223***  6.6750*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
rvolti, t-3, t-1  -1.3174  -8.347*** 
  (0.065)  (0.000) 
Sstoi, t-8, t-4    0.3336*** 
    (0.000) 
Ssri, t-8 t-4  0.5662***   
  (0.000)   
Downt  0.2656**  0.2205** 
  (0.016)  (0.019) 
     
Adj R
2
  0.3991  0.5469 
Stock FE  Yes  Yes 
Day FE  Yes  Yes 
Observations  12,575  12,575 
Firms   25   25 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Panel Regression Results  
The table presents the panel regression results from estimating the following equation where the dependent variable 
is short-selling activity from day t-3 to t-1. Short selling specifications are the standardized short ratio (Ssri, t-3 t-1) and 
standardized short turnover (Sstoi, t-3 t-1). 
 
SSRi, t-3,t-1 = β0 +  β1sizei,t +  β2reti,t-3t-1 + β3vtoi,t-3,t-1 + β4p_volti,t-3,t-1 + β5r_volti,t-3,t-1 +  β6SSR,t-8,t-4 + 
β7Downt + εi,t-3,t-1 (2) 
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Table 5 
Summary Statistics 
The table shows summary statistics for the opaqueness measures used in the analysis.   
 
Variable N Mean Median SD 
P/C Asset 
Opaqueness 25 1,699,130,954 91,824,140 4,356,077,674 
P/C Net Prem 
Written-Total 25 3,604,777,827 150,222,921 9,198,993,734 
L/H Asset 
Opaqueness 25 5,085,692,260 26,464,093 15,746,838,769 
A/H Net Prem 
Written 25 1,022,660,072 14,093,009 2,100,703,612 
L/H Total Assets 25 24,417,980,898 725,381,191 75,898,222,993 
L/H  Net Prem 
Written-Total 25 3,182,134,848 126,287,031 81,228,534,691 
Lopaque 25 74.4037 79.9105 28.3598 
Aopaque 25 18.4052 17.7136 11.3456 
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The independent variables include contemporaneous share turnover (turni,t-3,t-1), return volatility (r_volti,t-3,t-1), and 
price volatility (p_volti,t-3,t-1). We also include a lagged dependent variable to control for serial correlation (Sh_sell,t-
8,t-4) and the contemporaneous market-adjusted return (reti,t-3,t-1).  The variable of interest is Downt, which is an 
indicator variable equal to one on the IFSR downgrade announcement day.  Further the level of opaqueness in 
liabilities (Lopaque) and assets (Aopaque) are represented.  We also interact the dummy variable and the continuous 
variable for opaqueness in line of business and assets (Downt x Lopaquet ; Downt x Aopaquet) to determine whether 
the short selling is effected by the opaqueness of the insurers line of business or assets during the pre-announcement 
period.  The variable of interest is Downt, which is an indicator variable equal to one on the IFSR downgrade 
announcement day.  A Hausman test reveals fixed effects by stock and days.  P-values are reported in parentheses.  
  Ssri, t-3 t-1   Sstoi, t-3 t-1 
  [1]   [2] 
intercept 3.0589***  2.4502*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Sizei -0.2241***  -0.2138*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
reti, t-3, t-1 15.9827***  10.9415*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
vtoi, t-3, t-1 0.4964  114.6415*** 
 (0.994)  (0.000) 
pvolti, t-3, t-1 5.0041***  6.3586*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
rvolti, t-3, t-1 -0.6105  -4.4367*** 
 (0.2624)  (0.000) 
Sstoi, t-8, t-4   0.3004*** 
   (0.000) 
Ssri, t-8 t-4 0.5394**   
 (0.000)   
LOpaquet -0.0007**  -0.0011*** 
 (0.047)  (0.000) 
AOpaquet -0.0113***  -0.0092*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Downt 0.0546**  0.0653** 
 (0.024)  (0.042) 
LOpaquet X Downt -0.0027**  -0.0069** 
 (0.031)  (0.036) 
AOpaquet X Downt -0.0054**  -0.0055** 
 (0.019)  (0.041) 
    
 Adj R
2
 0.3993  0.5658 
Stock FE YES  YES 
Day FE YES  YES 
Observations 10,958  10,958 
N 25   25 
 
Table 6 
Panel Regression Results  
The table presents the panel regression results from estimating the following equation where the dependent variable 
is short-selling activity from day t-3 to t-1. Short selling specifications are the standardized short ratio (Ssri, t-3 t-1) and 
standardized short turnover (Sstoi, t-3 t-1). 
 
SSRi, t-3,t-1 = β0 +  β1sizei,t +  β2reti,t-3t-1 + β3vtoi,t-3,t-1 + β4p_volti,t-3,t-1 + β5r_volti,t-3,t-1 +  β6Sh_sell,t-8,t-4 + 
β7Downt +  β8Lopaquet + β9Aopaquet + β10Downt x Lopaquet +β11Downt x Aopaquet + εi,t-3,t-1 (4) 
 
SSTOi, t-3,t-1 = β0 +  β1sizei,t +  β2reti,t-3t-1 + β3vtoi,t-3,t-1 + β4p_volti,t-3,t-1 + β5r_volti,t-3,t-1 +  β6Sh_sell,t-8,t-4 + 
β7Downt +  β8Lopaquet + β9Aopaquet + β10Downt x Lopaquet +β11Downt x Aopaquet + εi,t-3,t-1 (5) 
 
 
79 
 
Table 7 
Short Selling around A.M. Best Rating Upgrades 
The table shows a standard event study of market-adjusted returns and short selling around A.M. Best rating 
upgrades.  We obtain downgrades from A.M. Best data and report the market-adjusted returns (the difference 
between the daily return and the CRSP equally-weighted return for a particular stock), the short ratio, and the short 
turnover surrounding rating downgrades.  Tests for significant returns are determined by standard t-statistics testing 
for differences from zero.  We test for the significance in short selling using two different methods.  We also 
standardize short selling activity by calculating the difference between the short activity for stock i on day t and the 
mean short activity for stock i (across the sample time period).  We then divide the difference by the standard 
deviation of daily short activity so that each short measure on each day is similarly distributed with a zero mea n and 
a unit variance.   T-statistics testing whether the standardized measure is significantly different than zero (the mean) 
are obtain.  Results from t-tests, which test whether the standardized and abnormal measures are significantly 
different than zero (the mean) are shown using asterisks. 
 
  Adjusted Returns Short Ratio Std_Short Ratio Short Turnover Std_SShort Turnover 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
t-8,t-4 0.0005 0.1856 -0.0142*** 0.0013 -0.0135** 
t-3 -0.0003* 0.2211 -0.0541*** 0.0012 -0.0081** 
t-2 0.0006 0.2301 -0.0319** 0.0016 -0.0046*** 
t-1 0.0035** 0.1987 -0.0628** 0.0041 -0.0265** 
event day 0.0102*** 0.2514 0.0823*** 0.0073 0.0677*** 
t+1 0.0041*** 0.2107 0.0471*** 0.0056 0.0223** 
t+2 0.0007** 0.2008 -0.0256 0.0018 -0.0183 
t+3 0.0002 0.1795 -0.0498** 0.0014 -0.0147 
t+4,t+8 0.0004 0.1979 -0.0227 0.0021 -0.0032 
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The independent variables include the daily share turnover (turn), price volatility (p_volt), and 
market capitalization (size).  We also include the contemporaneous returns ( rett) and a dummy 
variable (UP), which is equal to unity if day t is a upgrade rating day, zero otherwise.  A Hausman 
test reveals observed differences across stocks and days so we report two-way fixed effects 
estimates.  P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
  Ssri,t  Sstoi,t 
  [1]  [2] 
intercept  2.0162***  1.9512*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Sizei  -0.3017  -0.1655 
  (0.106)  (0.078) 
vtoi,t  2.451***  99.6623*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
pvolti,t  2.868***  5.4438*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
rvolti,t  -2.2144***  -4.6621*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
reti,t  6.7792***  10.6291*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Upt  0.3797**  0.1986** 
  (0.018)  (0.032) 
     
Adj R
2
  0.3396  0.4487 
Stock FE  Yes  Yes 
Day FE  Yes  Yes 
Observations  7,042  7,042 
Firms  14  14 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Panel Regression Results 
The table presents the panel regression results from estimating the following equation where the 
dependent variable is daily short-selling activity. 
 
SSRi t = β0 + β1sizei,t +  β2reti,t +β3vtoi,t + β4p_volti,t +  β5UPt + εi,t-5,t-1 (6) 
 
SSTOi t = β0 + β1sizei,t +  β2reti,t +β3vtoi,t + β4p_volti,t +  β5UPt + εi,t-5,t-1 (7) 
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ESSAY 3:  
DOES ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT INCREASE TRANSPARENCY? 
82 
 
CHAPTER 3.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last few decades corporate risk management has developed from a narrowly-
focused function into an enterprise-wide approach. The advent of Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM) has motivated a growing body of research related to its determinants, leadership, and 
value-relevance (e.g. Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003, Pagach and Warr, 2008, McShane, Nair, and 
Rustambekov, 2011, Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011). While several recent studies test whether 
ERM benefits firms, there is an absence of studies that examine how ERM can generate value. 
Our paper provides some initial evidence on one potential source of value from an ERM program 
– an increase in transparency regarding the firm’s risk profile. 
Proponents of ERM argue that for firms that are highly financially and operationally 
complex, individuals outside the firm are likely to have difficulty in assessing the firm’s 
financial strength and risk profile (Muelbroek, 2002). An ERM structure may enable opaque 
firms to provide information to outsiders (e.g. investors, regulators, and rating agencies) about 
their risk profile and may also serve as a signal of their commitment to risk management 
(Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003).  Industry commentators argue that ERM provides an opportunity 
to employ risk management practices to further increase management transparency, encourage 
consistency in aligning risk tolerance with risk appetite, and improve visibility and transparency 
to stakeholders.
8
 Moreover, with an effective ERM program in place, and with transparency into 
                                                 
8
 See for example discussions at http://www.boardmember.com/Article_Details.aspx?id=2252, and 
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Industries/Financial-Services/Insurance/2010-property_casualty-risk-management-
governance-transparency.  
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that program, stakeholders have a higher comfort level in the ability of management to define 
and achieve value-producing objectives.
9
 
Economic theory indicates several reasons why an increase in transparency, which is 
defined as the availability of firm-specific information to outsiders, should impact firm value 
(Wang, 2010). First, by reducing uncertainty and increasing transparency about a firm’s 
performance, there would be reduction stock price volatility (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). In 
addition, market microstructure models predict that by increasing information and transparency 
there is a resulting reduction in information asymmetries in the market (Diamond and Verrecchia 
1991).  Meulbroek (2002) suggests that integrated risk management can facilitate performance 
evaluations by outsiders by making disclosures of the risk management process more informative 
or accessible
10
 Taken together, these findings would suggest that transparency may enhance an 
outsider’s view of a firm’s risk profile resulting in value enhancement.  
We test for changes in transparency around the announcement of an ERM initiative. 
Consistent with prior literature we use the degree of dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts as a 
proxy for transparency and the announcement of the appointment of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) 
or Vice-President of Enterprise Risk Management (VP-ERM) as a proxy for an ERM initiative. 
From here forward we refer to the dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts as DISP, and the 
appointment of a CRO or VP-ERM as an ERM announcement. We find evidence of a significant 
reduction in DISP following the ERM announcement. Thus, our results suggest that ERM does 
increase transparency, which in turn is consistent with enhanced firm value. We extend our 
analysis and examine whether the increase in transparency varies according to the degree of firm 
                                                 
9
http://www.theiia.org/blogs/marks/index.cfm/post/S&P%20Publishes%20Status%20Report%20on%20ERM%20 
 
10
 McShane et al. (2011) indicates that transparency in the manner an organization’s risk management philosophy is 
communicated to the company is a contributing factor in the S&P ERM rating process. 
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opaqueness. Our results indicate that the increase in transparency resulting from the adoption of 
an ERM program is greatest for financial firms that tend to be operationally and financially 
opaque. 
The next section reviews the prior literature and develops our hypothesis. The sample and 
data are introduced in the subsequent section. The next two sections present our empirical 
methodology and discuss our results. The final section concludes.  
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CHAPTER 3.2 
PRIOR LITERATURE 
While there has been recent attention paid to ERM programs in the literature, by both 
academics and practitioners, there have been mixed results as to the value created by ERM. Hoyt 
and Liebenberg (2011) find a positive relation between the announcement of the appointment of 
a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and firm value, while Beasley et al. (2008) find firm-specific 
benefits of ERM for non-financial firms. However, recently, McShane et al. (2011) show that 
firm value increases as firms implement increasingly more sophisticated traditional risk 
management methods not ERM, while Pagach and Warr (2010) investigate a firms’ long-term 
performance around an ERM adoption and report results that ERM is not value creating.  
For some firms, ERM is clearly beneficial, whereas for others the benefit may not 
outweigh the costs, at least as perceived by stock market investors (Meulbroek, 2002). The value 
provided from ERM programs arises out of the improved information related to the firm’s risk 
profile. In firms that are highly financially and operationally complex, individuals outside the 
firm are likely to have difficulty in assessing the firm’s financial strength and risk profile. An 
ERM program enables firms to better provide information to outsiders about their risk profile 
and also serves as a signal of their commitment to risk management (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; 
Pagach & Warr, 2009; Beasley et al., 2008; Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003). This increase in 
transparency regarding the firm’s risk profile is a potential source of firm value; accordingly we 
focus our study on the effect of an ERM announcement on transparency.  Accordingly, using an 
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ERM announcement and motivated by previous literature which shows increases in transparency 
to be value enhancing for a firm, we propose the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The announcement of a CRO or VP-ERM will increase transparency.  
 
Research has suggested that transparency may increase the accuracy of publicly available 
information about management’s operating decisions (Francis and Martin, 2010). Additionally, 
transparency resulting from financial analyst following, factors into monitoring managerial 
behavior (Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2004). Thus, transparency may reduce the risk premium 
associated with the potential expropriation of shareholder wealth by opportunistic managers 
(Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2004). Further, prior literature suggests that financial analysts 
also serve as external monitors of corporate managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent 
with this notion, Lang et al. (2004) find that increased analyst coverage is associated with higher 
firm value. However, the economic impact of transparency is not limited to these more general 
capital market consequences; transparency can also directly contribute to economic performance 
by disciplining corporate insiders in better selection of investments, more efficient risk 
management, and reduced expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth (Bushman and Smith, 
2001).  
Investigating risk management activities in the gold mining industry, Tufano (1996) 
suggests that transparent firms should have higher value because of lower liquidity premiums 
and lower discounts demanded by incompletely diversified investors and transparent firms 
receive greater attention from investors and analysts. Additionally, transparency reduces the 
likelihood of distorted investment and financing decisions that arise when managers pursue their 
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own objectives (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990) or favor shareholders at the expense of 
bondholders (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Lower information asymmetry is valuable because 
transparency should lower adverse selection costs associated with securities issuance described 
in (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Collectively, this stream of literature shows that transparency can 
enhance shareholder wealth. 
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CHAPTER 3.3 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
Our sample consists of 100 individual firms, with a total of 128 announcements
11
 of the 
appointment of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) or Vice President of Enterprise Risk Management 
(VP-ERM) between 1993 and 2007 (Table 1). We use the announcement of the appointment of a 
CRO or VP-ERM as a proxy for the implementation of an ERM initiative (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 
2011; Pagach and Warr, 2009; Beasley et al. 2008). Our sample determination follows Hoyt & 
Liebenberg (2008) and Pagach and Warr (2009), in determining firms who have announced a 
CRO or VP-ERM. We use Factiva, Thomson, and other search engines to perform separate 
keyword searches. Our search strings included the following phrases, their acronyms, as well as 
the individual words within the same paragraph; “chief risk officer”, “vice president of 
Enterprise Risk Management”, “enterprise risk management”, “integrated risk management”. We 
chose these particular search strings because the titles of the positions (i.e. CRO, VP-ERM) are 
synonymous with management of an ERM program, and the other phrases are synonymous with 
enterprise risk management (Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003) (See Appendix 1). 
We obtain market data from CRSP and annual accounting data from COMPUSTAT. The 
Firstcall summary database was used to gather the earnings forecast data.  Individual firms were 
dropped from the sample if Firstcall data was not available for the firm around the announcement 
date. The Firstcall data contains median analyst earnings forecasts, the forecast standard 
deviation, and the number of analysts covering a specific firm. Our empirical analysis tests the 
                                                 
11
 In the case of multiple ERM announcements for the same firm in our sample period, we use the most recent 
announcement.  
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effect of ERM program adoption on transparency.  The following section documents the 
variables used in our analysis. 
 
Dependent Variable 
DISP:  Dispersion is computed (Eq 1) as the absolute value of the standard deviation of all 
individual annual earnings forecasts divided by the mean individual forecast (Barron, Stanford 
and Yu, 2005). A firm must have at least two individual forecasts for this measure to be 
computed. In our univariate analysis we partition DISP according to the closest, second closest, 
and third closets to the ERM announcement. The closest represents the DISP in the year 
immediately preceding and year immediately following the ERM announcement. The second and 
third closest represents the DISP in the second and third subsequent years immediately preceding 
and the second and third subsequent years immediately following the ERM announcement. 
 
       
                 
                               
 (1) 
 
Analysts’ forecasts or recommendations have been shown to be informative and often 
used empirically to proxy for information quality, investor beliefs, expected growth rates, and 
disagreement in opinion (Ang and Ciccone, 2001). DISP is thought of as a risk measure 
associated with investor uncertainty (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1998). The term transparency is 
used to convey an interpretation that firms with lower DISP are more easily understood 
financially or are more transparent to investors. Accordingly, a firm is called transparent if it has 
low DISP.  
 
 
90 
 
Independent Variables 
ERM: A dummy variable equal to 1 for the years following an ERM announcement and 0 for the 
years prior to an ERM announcement. Observations relating to the year of the ERM 
announcements are removed to avoid potential bias caused by the fact that these announcements 
happen at various times throughout the year. We hypothesize a negative relation between ERM 
and DISP. The average level of disagreement among analysts is expected to be lower for firms 
that have appointed senior officers to lead their ERM programs and communicate the firm risk 
profile to outsiders. 
 
RVOLT: Stock return volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns for 
each calendar year. Alford and Berger (1999) and Thomas (2002) suggests that as volatility 
increases, the amount of price-relevant information that analysts must process also goes up and 
analysts’ ability to forecast earnings declines. Thus, firms with higher volatility are expected to 
have greater analyst disagreement.  
 
R&D: Research and development is the ratio of R&D expense to sales and INTA is the ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets. Barth et al. (1998) suggests that the level of analyst effort and 
possibly the quality of analysts’ forecasts vary with the degree to which firm value is comprised 
of tangible assets.  
 
MB: Market to Book ratio is defined as the ratio of the firm’s market value (market value of 
equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity) to the firm’s book 
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value of total assets. Thomas (2002) includes MB as a proxy for the quality of investment 
opportunities.  
 
MVE: We take the natural log of market value of equity, which is a common proxy for firm size 
(Thomas, 2002).  
 
LEVG: Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets, 
representing a proxy for risk. Thomas (2002) suggests that leverage adds to the volatility of 
earnings, and firms with higher leverage might be expected to increase dispersion among 
forecasts. 
 
FIN: A dummy variable equal to 1 for financial institution (N=52) and 0 for non-financial 
institutions (N=48). Financial institutions are defined as firms that fall within the SIC code 6021-
6282 (banking) and 6311-6411 (insurance). There is consensus in the literature that financial 
institutions present an increased degree of information asymmetry between 
shareholders/claimholders, investors and the firm due to opaqueness of their liability and asset 
structure (Ross, 1989; Polonchek and Miller, 1999; Babbel and Merrill, 2005; Baranoff and 
Sager, 2002; Zhang et al. 2009). We expect that increase in transparency resulting from the 
adoption of an ERM program will be greatest for financial firms that tend to be operationally and 
financially opaque. 
Descriptive statistics and definitions for each of these variables are reported in Table 2. A 
few items are noteworthy. While, it is apparent that DISP is heavily skewed as its mean is almost 
three times greater than its median; this result is consistent with others who show dispersion 
extremely positively skewed and that the mean of dispersion is nearly four times larger than its 
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median (Qu, Starks and Yan, 2004). In our multivariate analysis we trim DISP at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles to eliminate outliers that were observed in diagnostic tests and to correct for this 
skewness. CROs or VP-ERMs are in place (so ERM=1) in over one-third of sample firm-years. 
R&D is missing for the majority of firm-years and is accordingly eliminated from our 
multivariate analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3.4 
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
Our empirical analysis investigates whether DISP is lower in the years following ERM-related 
appointments, than before the ERM-related appointments.  In our univariate test, we calculate 
dispersion for the three closest groups of earnings forecast estimates: closest, second closest, and 
third closest around (prior to and following) an announcement.  The difference in DISP was 
calculated as the DISP before the announcement minus the DISP following an announcement. 
We hypothesize that if DISP following an ERM announcement is less than prior to the 
announcement there is an indication of increased transparency as a result of the announcement. 
We perform a simple univariate comparison (t-test) to determine significance of the difference in 
DISP if any exists.  
Our multivariate analysis examines the relation between ERM and DISP while 
controlling for other DISP determinants. OLS1 is an ordinary least squares regression, OLS2 
adds year dummies to OLS1, and the third model is a fixed effects regression that includes both 
firm and year effects (dummies). The fixed effects model is preferred over a random-effects 
model as determined by our Hausman specification test (Hausman Chi-squared=30.67). 
Specifically, we model DISP as a function of whether an ERM program was in place and a set of 
DISP determinants. If an ERM announcement provides transparency (i.e. reduction in DISP) into 
a firms risk profile, then we expect the estimate for ERM to be significantly negative.  
Specifically, the following equation is estimated across all firms (i=1 to 100) that announced an 
ERM initiative during the sample period (t=1990 to 2006).
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DISPit= β0 + β1 ERMit+ β2 RVOLTit+ β3 INTAit+  β4 MBit+ β5 MVEit+ β6 LEVGit+ εit  (2) 
 
We extend our analysis of DISP around ERM announcements and test the relation 
between changes in DISP around ERM announcements for financial institutions.  Specifically, 
this test is to determine whether changes in DISP resulting from the announcements differs for 
firms that are operationally and financially opaque. Estimation results for the following equation 
are reported in Table 7. 
 
DISPi,t= β0 + β1 ERMi,t+ β2 RVOLTi,t+ β3 INTAi,t+ β4 MBi,t+ β5 MVEi,t+ β6 LEVGi,t 
+ β7 FINi,t+ β8 FIN X ERMi,t + εit  (3) 
 
The dependent and independent variables are the same as those defined in equation (1) 
with the exception of FIN and its interaction with ERM. As in equation 2, we expect the estimate 
for ERM to be significantly negative. Further, due to the opaque and operationally complex 
nature of financial instructions, we expect the estimate for FIN to be significantly positive. 
Lastly, we interact ERM and FIN to determine whether the effect of ERM on DISP differs for 
financial firms. As before, OLS1 as an ordinary least squares regression, OLS2 adds year 
dummies to OLS1, and the third model is a fixed effects regression.    
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CHAPTER 3.5 
RESULTS 
Table 3 report the univariate findings for annual dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast 
for the average of each of the three closest groups of estimates.  The findings suggest that around 
a CRO or VP-ERM announcement there is a significant decrease in dispersion following such an 
announcement. Table 4 presents the correlation coefficients for each of the variables. 
Table 5 reports differences in means and medians between firm-years where a CRO or 
VP-ERM is in place and those where the appointment has not yet been made. Most notably, the 
mean and median DISP is significantly lower in firm-years where an ERM initiative is in place. 
Table 6 reports the results for ERM across all three models which confirm the univariate results 
discussed above. The announcement of an ERM initiative results in a significant reduction in 
uncertainty regarding future earnings, as proxied by DISP.  
We extend our analysis and examine whether the increase in transparency varies 
according to the degree of firm opaqueness. Our results indicate that the increase in transparency 
resulting from the adoption of an ERM program is greatest for financial firms that tend to be 
operationally and financially opaque. In table 7, columns [1 & 2], we find a positive and 
significant FIN coefficient and an increasingly negative and significant ERM coefficient. The 
positive and significant FIN coefficient indicates that DISP is higher in financial firms compared 
to non-financial firms. This result would be expected as financial firms are arguably more 
opaque than non-financial firms (Ross, 1989; Polonchek and Miller, 1999; Babbel and Merrill, 
2005; Baranoff and Sager, 2002; Zhang et al. 2009). Taken together, the indication is ERM 
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announcements within financial firms have a stronger influence on an increase in transparency 
than that of non-financial firms. This result would be consistent with the intuition that ERM 
provides an increase in the transparency of normally more opaque firms. We interact FIN with 
ERM to determine whether the effect of ERM on DISP differs for financial firms. The results 
shows the FIN X ERM coefficient is negative and significant suggesting that the reduction in 
DISP is greater for financial firms than for less opaque non-financial firms These results are 
confirmed in columns [3 & 4] of the fixed effects model when comparing the negative and 
significant ERM coefficient between the sample of financial and non-financial firms (-0.0493 to 
-0.0411). This result shows the increase in transparency around an ERM announcement is more 
pronounced for financial firms than for non-financials.  
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CHAPTER 3.6 
CONCLUSIONS 
The emergence of ERM has led to an increasing body of literature investigating its 
determinants, management structure, and value-relevance (e.g. Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003, 
Pagach and Warr, 2008, McShane, Nair, and Rustambekov, 2011, Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011). 
While several recent studies test whether ERM benefits firms, there is an absence of studies that 
examine how ERM can generate value. Our paper provides some initial evidence on one 
potential source of value from an ERM program; an increase in transparency regarding the firm’s 
risk profile.  Finance theory suggests several ways in which transparency creates value for 
shareholders, such as information accuracy, reduced risk premium, and reduced uncertainty in 
corporate investment and operating activities.  
Using a sample of 100 firms that announced ERM-related appointments between 1993 
and 2007, we examine DISP surrounding these ERM announcements. Our empirical analysis 
investigates whether DISP is lower in the years following ERM-related appointments, than 
before the ERM-related appointments. Specifically, we model DISP as a function of whether an 
ERM program was in place and a set of DISP determinants. We find that transparency increases 
after ERM-related announcements. Our results also indicate that the increase in transparency 
resulting from the adoption of an ERM program is greatest for financial firms that tend to be 
operationally and financially opaque.
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Table 1. The table presents the distribution of CRO or VP-ERM announcements over the period 1993-2007.  
 Total 
Total-
CRO 
Total-
VPERM Sample 
Sample-
CRO 
Sample-
VPERM 
Years       
1993 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1994 5 2 3 2 0 1 
1995 8 4 4 5 3 2 
1996 6 4 2 2 2 0 
1997 8 4 2 2 2 1 
1998 5 4 1 2 1 1 
1999 14 5 9 4 1 5 
2000 21 13 6 8 5 2 
2001 14 8 6 8 6 4 
2002 20 9 6 14 6 7 
2003 25 12 13 18 11 6 
2004 31 19 12 23 14 8 
2005 29 14 15 18 11 7 
2006 10 5 5 8 4 4 
2007 17 9 8 14 6 8 
Total 214 113 92 128 72 56 
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Table 2. The table presents descriptive statistics and definitions for each of the variables. 
Variable Definition N Mean Median 
DISP Average analyst dispersion following an 
ERM announcement 907 0.1028 0.0386 
ERM Equal to 1 the years following an ERM 
announcement, 0 otherwise 907 0.3451 0.0000 
LEVG Ratio of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities to total assets  651 0.2131 0.2527 
MB Ratio of the firm’s market value to the firm’s 
book value of total assets 907 1.1369 1.0883 
R&D 
Ratio of R&D expense to sales  146 0.0264 0.0159 
INTA 
Ratio of intangible assets to total assets  809 0.0672 0.0210 
MVE Natural log of the Market value of equity 
(000s) 907 4.2046 3.7325 
RVOLT 
Annual return volatility 761 0.0201 0.0197 
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Table 3. 
The table presents statistics that describe the dispersion in analysts’ Annual earnings estimates around the 
announcement of a Chief Risk Officer (CRO) or a Vice President of Enterprise Risk Management (VP-ERM). 
Dispersion is calculated as the absolute value of the standard deviation of the analysts forecast divided by the mean 
forecast [abs (SD/Mean)]. Three dispersion time points relative to the announcement date (closest, second closest, 
and third closest) were calculated to examine dispersion prior to and following the announcement. Panel A reports the 
summary statistics and a univariate (t-test) comparison of the three time points and the difference of mean dispersion 
prior to and following an announcement. Panels B, & C report statistics and differences for the average of the next 
closest dispersion measures, and the average of the third closest dispersion measures, around the announcement date 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Annual Dispersion: Average of the Closest Estimates to the Announcement 
 N Mean Std Minimum Maximum 
Before 103 .1416 .2056 0.0000 1.5143 
After 106 .0824 .1262 0.0000 .9427 
Difference 102 .0593*** .1912 -.501 1.4102 
Panel B. Annual Dispersion: Average of the Second Closest Estimates to the Announcement 
 N Mean Std Minimum Maximum 
Before 103 .1745 .3269 0.0000 2.9316 
After 106 .0762 .0972 0.0000 0.5874 
Difference 102 .0983*** .3019 -.167 2.8418 
Panel C. Annual Dispersion: Average of the Third Closest Estimates to the Announcement 
 N Mean Std Minimum Maximum 
Before 103 .1774 .2885 .0118 2.0442 
After 106 .0718 .088 .0053 0.5496 
Difference 102 .1059*** .2527 -.098 1.9553 
***, **,* Statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. The table presents correlation statistics between each of the variables. 
Variables DISP ERM LEVG MB R&D INTA MVE RVOLT 
          
DISP -        
          
ERM 
-
0.06389** -       
          
LEVG 0.1162** -0.0127 -      
          
MB 0.00381 0.01526 -0.0682* -     
          
R&D 0.16778** -0.04206 
-
0.37847*** 0.62*** -    
          
INTA 0.03761 0.12027** 0.24528*** 0.21783*** 
-
0.20408** -   
          
MVE -0.04182 0.19774*** -0.01434 0.08898** 0.01901 -0.02547 -  
          
RVOLT 0.03036 0.03751 0.04436 0.06332* 
-
0.18894** 0.21521*** 
-
0.04904 - 
***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102 
 
Table 5. The table presents differences in means and medians between firm-years where a CRO or VP-ERM is in 
place and those where the appointment has not yet been made. 
  ERM=1 ERM=0    
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median ∆ Mean ∆ Median 
DISP 313 0.1841 0.0750 594 0.3795 0.1459 -0.1954** -0.0708808*** 
LEVG 258 0.2825 0.2873 393 0.2875 0.3039 -0.0050 -0.0165 
MB 313 1.3774 1.2269 594 1.3567 1.1492 0.0208 0.077*** 
R&D 85 0.0258 0.0154 61 0.0295 0.0157 -0.0037 -0.0003 
INTA 303 0.0894 0.0468 506 0.0604 0.0081 0.0289*** 0.0387*** 
MVE 313 4.4489 3.8357 594 3.9843 3.6172 0.4646*** 0.2185*** 
RVOLT 309 0.0183 0.0157 452 0.0176 0.0159 0.0007 -0.0002 
***,**,* represent statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6.  
Panel Regression Results 
The table presents the panel regression results from estimating the following equation. 
DISPi,t= β0 + β1 ERMi,t+ β2 RVOLTi,t+ β3 INTAi,t+ β4 MBi,t+ β5 MVEi,t+ β6 LEVGi,t+ εit  (1) 
 
The dependent variable DISP is the absolute value of the standard deviation of all individual analyst earnings 
forecasts (annually) divided by the mean individual forecast. Our variable of interest is ERM, which is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for the years following a CRO or VP-ERM announcement and 0 for the years prior to an ERM 
announcement. Leverage (LEVG) is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets, 
representing our proxy for risk. Market to book (MB) ratio is defined as the ratio of the firm’s market value (market 
value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity) to the firm’s book value of total 
assets. INTA is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Market value of equity (MVE) is our proxy for firm size. 
Stock return volatility (RVOLT) is calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns for each calendar year. 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
  OLS1 OLS2 Fixed Effects 
ERM -0.0553385*** -0.0604969** -0.0453204* 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.027) 
    
LEVG 0.1972933*** 0.1848344*** 0.2809068** 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.114) 
    
MB -0.031851*** -0.0379054*** -0.0922466*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) 
    
INTA 0.075 0.103 0.3549053** 
 (0.063) (0.064) (0.159) 
    
MVE -0.0034** -0.0061** -0.0048** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
RVOLT 3.142765** 5.323854*** 2.891571** 
 (0.797) (0.972) (1.145) 
    
Constant 0.1479298*** 0.1441625*** 0.1503168*** 
 (0.030) (0.041) (0.058) 
    
Year Effects No Yes Yes 
Firm Effects No No Yes 
Hausman Chi-sq.   30.67* 
# observations 497 497 497 
R-squared 0.122 0.157 0.206 
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Table 7.  
Panel Regression Results 
The table presents the panel regression results from estimating the following equation. 
 
DISPi,t= β0 + β1 ERMi,t+ β2 RVOLTi,t+ β3 INTAi,t+ β4 MBi,t+ β5 MVEi,t+ β6 LEVGi,t+ β7 FINi,t+ β8 FIN X ERMi,t + εit  
(2) 
 
The dependent variable DISP is the absolute value of the standard deviation of all individual analyst earnings 
forecasts (annually) divided by the mean individual forecast. Our variable of interest is ERM, which is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 for the years following a CRO or VP-ERM announcement and 0 for the years prior to an ERM 
announcement, and FIN which is a dummy variable equal to 1 for financial institution (N=52) and 0 for non-
financial institutions (N=48). We also interact the dummy variables (ERM X FIN) to determine whether the effect of 
ERM on DISP differs for financial firms. Leverage (LEVG) is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities to total assets, representing our proxy for risk. Market to book (MB) ratio is defined as the ratio of the 
firm’s market value (market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity) to the 
firm’s book value of total assets. INTA is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. Market value of equity (MVE) 
is our proxy for firm size. Stock return volatility (RVOLT) is calculated as the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns for each calendar year. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
  OLS1 OLS2 Fixed Effects 
   
Financial 
Institution 
Non-Financial 
Institution 
Constant 0.1517** 0.1438** 0.1619** 0.1622** 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.024) 
ERM -0.0598** -0.0647** -0.0493** -0.0411** 
 (0.019) (0.024) (0.027) (0.042) 
LEVG 0.1987** 0.1883** 0.2976** 0.3103** 
 (0.041) (0.027) (0.021) (0.045) 
MB -0.0412** -0.0367** -0.0798** -0. 0614** 
 (0.047) (0.016) (0.022) (0.018) 
INTA 0.0543 0.0867 0.4128** 0.4015** 
 (0.126) (0.141) (0.046) (0.049) 
MVE -0.0021** -0.0016** -0.0028** -0.0034** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.027) (0.014) 
RVOLT 2.2351** 5.1166** 3.0012** 2.9778** 
 (0.038) (0.047) (0.028) (0.025) 
FIN 0.0775** 0.0813**   
 (0.026) (0.014)   
FIN X ERM -0.0988** -0.0837**   
 (0.031) (0.041)   
     
Year Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effects No No Yes Yes 
# observations 497 497 203 294 
R-squared 0.117 0.186 0.234 0.216 
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